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SPECIAL AGREEMENTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA:
REALITY'S CONFLICT WITH LEGAL THEORY
ADRIENNE C. MEISELS
"[T]he strong do what they can and the weak
do what they must."
Thucydides1
INTRODUCTION
Fifty years ago,' the drafters3 of the United Nations Charter
("Charter") had noble ambitions4 to counteract international hostili-
ties and foster a global environment of peace. Their firm resolve
never again to see the death and destruction caused by two world wars
led to the enactment of measures that they believed would create a
1. Thomas M Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations 115 (1990) (cita-
tion omitted).
2. The United Nations' Charter was adopted on June 26, 1945, and the U.N. re-
cently celebrated its fiftieth anniversary. Barbara Crossette, U.N. Finds Skepticism is
Eroding the Hope That is its Foundation, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1995, § 1, at 1. The
U.N. has faced much criticism since its inception, and many lawyers and academicians
recognized that its anniversary should mark a time when the U.N. is "re-examin[ed]
and reapprais[ed]" because it "has many faults." Id.
3. Fifty nations met in San Francisco to draft the U.N. Charter. Mark W. Janis,
An Introduction to International Law 196 (2d ed. 1993). The main powerhouses who
had proposed the Charter at Dumbarton Oaks were the four victorious World War II
Allies: the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China. Id. France
later joined these four nations to comprise the "Big Five" permanent members of the
U.N. Security Council, id. at 198, the organ of the U.N. which has primary responsibil-
ity for maintaining international peace and security. U.N. Charter art. 24, 1 1.
4. See U.N. Charter pmbl.
We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding gener-
ations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought un-
told sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights,
in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and
women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under
which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other
sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social pro-
gress and better standards of life in larger freedom, and for these ends to
practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good
neighbors, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and se-
curity, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of
methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest,
and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic
and social advancement of all peoples, have resolved to combine our efforts
to accomplish these aims.
Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assem-
bled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found
to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the
United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be
known as the United Nations.
Id.
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more effective organization than the failed League of Nations
("League").5 The U.N. differed from its predecessor in two important
ways. It benefited from both the membership of the United States
and the Soviet Union6 and the U.N. Security Council's legal ability to
employ designated national military contingents.7 The Charter archi-
tects intended Article 438 of the Charter ("Article 43") to give the
organization the enforcement strength necessary to realize and en-
force their goal of international peace.' Despite the drafters' hopes,
much contention existed among the permanent members of the Secur-
ity Council over the development of Article 43 that foreshadowed the
article's impotence.' ° Although U.N. member states have engaged in
military force in foreign territories "on the call"" of the U.N., no gov-
ernment has ever entered into an Article 43 special agreement with
the Security Council. 2
5. See Janis, supra note 3, at 196; see also infra text accompanying notes 130-41
(discussing the failure of the League).
6. Ironically, the membership of these two states nullified the collective enforce-
ment power of the Security Council for 45 years during the Cold War. Abdel-Latif M.
Zeidan, The United Nations Emergency Force 1956-1967, at 5-6 (1976).
7. The collective security provisions of the Charter to date have not functioned as
the architects had envisioned originally. See discussion infra parts I.C, III.
8. Article 43 states:
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the mainte-
nance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to
the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement
or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of
passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and
security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of
forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the
facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible
on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between
the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and
groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states
in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
U.N. Charter art. 43, 15 1-3.
9. Article 43 provides for the allocation of contingents for Security Council ac-
tions by member states and thus, enables the Security Council to have enforcement
strength. Article 43 requires all U.N. member states to make forces available on the
call of the Security Council and in accordance with special agreements which govern
the logistics of such forces. See also Leland M. Goodrich et al., Charter of the United
Nations: Commentary and Documents 316-17 (3d ed. 1969) (noting that U.N. mem-
ber nations are obligated to take military action to maintain global peace and security
under Article 42 of the Charter if the nations have concluded Article 43 special
agreements).
10. See discussion infra part I.C.
11. See discussion infra part III (describing when American presidents used a U.N.
resolution which "authorized" or "recommended" action as a pretext for military
force).
12. Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, Agora; The Gulf Crisis in International and
Foreign Relations Law, UN Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Old Order Changeth",
85 Am. J. Int'l L. 63, 67 (1991); see infra part III.
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The U.N. drafters also granted "veto" 3 power to the permanent
members of the Security Council, allowing any one of them unilater-
ally to terminate any Security Council resolution or action.'4 This
power often has resulted in a deadlock within the Security Council,
especially during the Cold War, thereby inhibiting the formation of
Article 43 special agreements.15
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s and the con-
clusion of the Cold War renewed the hopes of many policymakers' 6
and legal theoreticians' 7 that the newly "cooperative" member states
would enter into Article 43 special agreements. Recognizing the
changed atmosphere in the U.N. as well as the new demands on the
organization as an international arbiter of peace,' 8 Secretary General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992 called for the revival of collective se-
curity and Article 43 as the U.N. founders had envisioned.' 9 Despite
the termination of the ideological hostilities of the Cold War and the
opportunity provided by subsequent U.N. actions in Somalia, Haiti,
13. U.N. Charter art. 27; see infra note 112 (quoting text of U.N. Charter art. 27).
14. See discussion infra part LD (tracing the development of the veto power in the
Charter).
15. See infra parts III-IV (discussing the impasse created by the veto).
16. An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keep-
ing; Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit
Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 1 15,
U.N. Doc. A/47/277 (1992) [hereinafter Agenda for Peace] (calling for renewed use of
Article 43 by Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali); see Alex Morrison, The Fic-
tion of a U.N. Standing Army, Fletcher F. World Aft., Winter/Spring 1994, at 83, 90
(citing to various government documents which "continue the call" for Article 43 spe-
cial agreements).
17. See e.g., William M. Evan, Now is the Tune to Create a U.N. Army, Phila.
Inquirer, Aug. 7, 1992, at A23 ("[N]ow, with the cold war over, the world community
has a rare opportunity to create a global institution in the service of world peace."); A
U.N. Army? Peace-keeping Ain't What It Used To Be; To Do It Right Requires a Lot
More Muscle, Phila. Inquirer, Feb. 21, 1993, at C4 (describing how to revive Article 43
in the post-Cold War era); Brian Urquhart, World Needs a New Mechanism to Stop
Civil Wars, Star Tribune, Jan. 3, 1992, at A13 ("Perhaps, Article 43's time has now
come. . . ."). Compare James E. Rossman, Article 43: Arming the United Nations
Security Council, 27 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 227 (1994) (assuming that implementing
Article 43 is realistically possible as long as the present opposition to collective mili-
tary action gives way to some new "political will" favoring cooperation) with Tom
Morganthau et al., Globo-Cops, Newsweek, Aug. 23, 1993, at 14, ("[A]s former State
Department official John Bolton says, 'We are the central multilateralists. The idea
that there's some collective international will out there is just fairyland stuff.'").
18. Agenda for Peace, supra note 16, 15.
19. Id. 43. Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated-
[T]he option of taking [military action to maintain or restore international
peace and security] is essential to the credibility of the United Nations as a
guarantor of international security. This will require bringing into being,
through negotiations, the special agreements foreseen in Article 43 pf the
Charter, whereby Member States undertake to make armed forces, assist-
ance and facilities available to the Security Council... not only on an ad hoc
basis but on a permanent basis.
Id.
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and Bosnia, however, no member state has entered into any Article 43
special agreements.2"
The common barrier to invoking Article 43 both during the Cold
War and post-Cold War eras has been the doctrine of sovereignty, a
principle which involves states acting independently of each other,
based on their exclusive jurisdiction over a territory and permanent
population living there, and is defined by their refusal to surrender
their powers to another state or organization. 21 Sovereignty, an inher-
ent element of international law, is a natural rival to the establishment
of international organizations created to dictate to independent na-
tions. This doctrine specifically conflicts with Article 43's requirement
that individual sovereign nations relinquish control of their military
forces to an international organization for potentially deadly
operations.
In addition to the conflict between the doctrine of sovereignty and
the Article 43 and veto provisions, some nations are hindered from
participating in such military agreements by their own codes or consti-
tutions. The United States, for example, faces a domestic hurdle to
entering Article 43 agreements under its Constitution which divides
war powers between the executive and legislative branches.' Con-
gress addressed this dilemma in 1945 by passing the U.N. Participation
Act ("U.N.P.A."), 23 which sought to resolve these international and
20. See, e.g., Anthony Goodman, Haiti Has U.N. Blessing but Isn't Yet a U.N. Op-
eration, Reuters, Limited, Sept. 19, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuna
File (referring to a new cooperation between the United States and Russia in the
U.N.).
21. See infra part I.A. This Note concentrates on joint international military ac-
tion under U.N. command. The author recognizes that U.S. forces did serve under
foreign commanders in a few previous actions. These military actions, however, were
only short-term, emergency situations. Michael J. Glennon & Allison R. Hayward,
Collective Security and the Constitution: Can the Commander in Chief Power Be Dele-
gated to the United Nations?, 82 Geo. LJ. 1573, 1586 (1994). Scholars have noted that
an Article 43 special agreement, which specifies continual Security Council command
over U.S. troops, is a different situation. Id.
22. For purposes of this Note, the "division" of Constitutional war powers refers
to the Constitution granting both Congress and the President military powers. See
infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text (detailing the war powers division).
23. Section 287d of the United Nations Participation Act, codified at 22 U.S.C.
§§ 287-87e (1988), states the following in relevant part:
The President is authorized to negotiate a special agreement or agreements
with the Security Council which shall be subject to the approval of the Con-
gress by appropriate Act or joint resolution, providing for the numbers and
types of armed forces, their degree of readiness ... to be made available to
the Security Council on its call for the purpose of maintaining international
peace and security in accordance with article 43 of said Charter. The Presi-
dent shall not be deemed to require the authorization of the Congress to
make available to the Security Council on its call in order to take action
under article 42 of said Charter and pursuant to such special agreement or
agreements the armed forces, facilities, or assistance provided for therein
(emphasis added).
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domestic tensions by empowering the President to negotiate Article
43 special agreements with the Security Council, subject to congres-
sional approval.2 Because the United States has never entered into
an Article 43 agreement, however, the U.N.P.A. has not been em-
ployed.2 Furthermore, Congress is presently cutting U.N. funding
and restricting the President's ability to engage U.S. troops in U.N.
operations.' Such congressional actions will impede the future ability
of the Security Council to participate in peace-keeping operations.2 7
In light of the natural tension which exists between the doctrine of
sovereignty and Article 43 coupled with the veto power granted by the
Charter, this Note examines whether the article offers a realistic solu-
tion to international military conflicts. Part I of this Note examines
the doctrine of sovereignty and its relation to international law. This
part also explores the intentions of the Charter drafters with respect
to collective security, Article 43 special agreements, and the veto
power. Part II discusses the theory and intent behind the special
agreements as understood by the U.S. Senate during the Charter rati-
fication and passage of the U.N.P.A. Part III examines specific situa-
tions highlighting the failure to implement the special agreements
during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. 8 Part IV explores the
common legal and policy factors that have existed since the Cold War
and which explain the failure to make the special agreements. This
Note concludes that the political reality of sovereignty prevents na-
tions, when furnished with the weapon of a veto, from realizing the
legal ideology29 of the U.N. founders and thus prevents them from
24. Id.
25. As a result of Congress never employing the U.N.P.A., the domestic tension
inherent in the distribution of constitutional war powers remains a highly debated
legal issue. See infra note 176 and accompanying text. This Note will focus on the
international tension of the failure to make special agreements at the U.N. level, an
action which precedes using the U.N.P.A, which embodies the domestic tension facing
the United States. This Note will examine the U.N.P.A. only in relation to its poten-
tial to constrain the United States as an international superpower and member of the
Security Council
26. See infra part IV.B (noting the U.S.'s restrictions on U.N. involvement).
27. Id
28. Part III will examine the crises in Korea, Kuwait, Haiti, and Bosnia.
29. For purposes of this Note, "legal ideal," or any permutation of the word
"ideal," refers to the Charter drafters' expectations of the operation of Article 43, a
legal mechanism. Interestingly, even at the time of the Charter's drafting, there was
significant doubt about the U.N.'s mission. See Crossette, supra note 2, § 1, at 1. One
academician and alternate U.S. representative to the U.N. for special political affairs
from 1981 to 1984 said,
The initial concept was terribly, terribly flawed.... It is, I suppose, theoreti-
cally possible to set up an institution that is somehow or other going to be
better than the people who set it up ... that is going to be more responsive
to an objective world view, that will identify aggressors rapidly, that will
identify trouble spots rapidly and that will have mass resources to do some-
thing about it. It is theoretically possible, but it's very unlikely.
Id. (statement of Charles M. Lichenstein, a cochairman of a congressionally man-
dated Commission on Improving the Effectiveness of the United Nations).
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engaging in the type of military role contemplated by Article 43. This
Note also draws parallels between the U.N. and the European Com-
munity and proposes that the permanent members of the Security
Council relinquish their veto power over Article 43 special agree-
ments. Absent such relinquishment, Article 43 special agreements
may never be realized.
I. THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE EMERGENCE OF
THE UNITED NATIONS
The concept of "sovereignty" is the cornerstone of international
law.3° Sovereignty is also a defining component of independent state-
hood and thus, ironically, acts as a hindrance to cooperation among
states and poses a formidable challenge to the Charter, which is based
on "international law." This part will examine the origins of the doc-
trine of sovereignty, its relationship to and potential conflict with in-
ternational law, and the birth of the U.N.
A. The Doctrine of Sovereignty
Sovereignty emerged with the swift rise of national monarchies in
the thirteenth century as the feudal era ended and the Christian
church's influence over Europe diminished. With the growth of
monarchies came a new thinking towards social and economic
forces,32 as monarchs adopted the former Roman emperors' philoso-
phy of power and the "right" to arbitrarily impose law.
33
Niccolo Machiavelli advanced the theory of sovereignty in his guide
to statehood, The Prince.4 He asserted that an ordered nation would
afford its citizens many benefits and was thus the ultimate goal in
statesmanship.35 To achieve this stable society, Machiavelli reasoned
that sovereigns should be unconstrained in their ability to rule, "ac-
countable to no external norms. '36 This philosophy resulted in an
"expressed belief that relationships among political states were unre-
strainedly competitive; it was a matter of every state for itself."
37
30. John W. Head, Supranational Law: How the Move Toward Multilateral Solu-
tions Is Changing the Character of "International" Law, 42 Kan. L. Rev. 605, 606
(1994) (detailing the development of international law and the rise of "multilateraliza-
tion"-attempts to handle the conflicts between nations through the establishment of
new legal regimes designed to apply globally).
31. Charles S. Edwards, Hugo Grotius, The Miracle of Holland: A Study in Polit-
ical and Legal Thought 81 (1981).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 82 ("The Prince of 1513 was a 'how to' book, a handbook of advice for a
ruler on how to achieve, exercise, and retain political power.").
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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Thus, national self-interest became the predominant motivation for
governing.38
In the eighteenth century, theoreticians such as John Locke and
Jean Jacques Rousseau espoused the theory that the people as a body
were the sovereign, thus justifying the notion of constitutional govern-
ment and the American and French revolutions.39 Finally, modem
theoreticians in the nineteenth century abandoned the attempt to
place absolute power in any specific person or body within the state,
and instead, assigned it to the state itself, defining it as a juristic per-
son.n° This embodiment of sovereignty in a state gave rise to the mod-
em notion of nationalism, the seeds of which can be found in the
sixteenth-century Reformation when the reigning sovereigns found
the opportunity to distance their monarchies from the grasp of the
Church.41 The rise of nationalism, however, led to a major problem
for international law because "if sovereignty means absolute power,
and if states are sovereign in that sense, they cannot at the same time
be subject to law."42 Consequently, the modem state becomes bound
38. 1& at 82-83. Several other political theorists advanced the idea of sovereignty.
Jean Bodin, a French nationalist, claimed that sovereignty was supreme human
power, unlimited by law, of a monarch over his citizens. Id. at 83. Bodin, unlike
Machiavelli, did limit the idea of a monarch's power to the constraints of custom and
natural law, the "universal precepts of nature discernible by all rational beings." Id. at
84. Bodin's proposition of the doctrine of sovereignty posed no problem for the inter-
national lawyer. J.L Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the Interna-
tional Law of Peace 10 (6th ed. 1963) ("Sovereignty for him was an essential principle
of internal political order, and he would certainly have been surprised if he could have
foreseen that later writers would distort it into a principle of international disorder,
and use it to prove that by their very nature states are above the law."). Thomas
Hobbes developed the power of the sovereign further. Hobbes believed that "[l1aw
neither makes the sovereign, nor limits his authority; it is might that makes the sover-
eign, and law is merely what he commands." Id. at 12-13. Francisco Suarez, a Spanish
Jesuit theologian, described four types of law which governed the world: eternal, di-
vine, natural, and human. Edwards, supra note 31, at 87-88. Natural law, based on the
"natural qualities of man," and human law, based on the customs of nations, both
comprised the law of nations. Id. at 84. Hugo Grotius' premise of the law of nations
suspiciously mimicked that of Suarez's. See Head, supra note 30, at 608 (stating that
Grotius set forth "a body of rules that acknowledged the political primacy of the
nation-state, but subjected its leaders to fundamental dictates of natural law").
39. Brierly, supra note 38, at 14. Brierly comments, however, that this theory is
flawed because the whole people cannot be sovereign due to conflicting views and no
absolute unity of mind over every political and legal decision. Id. at 14-15.
40. Id. at 15.
41. Edwards, supra note 31, at 82.
42. Brierly, supra note 38, at 16. Hobbes described the states' relations to one
another in a famous passage:
"Kings and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency,
are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators; their
forts, and garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms, and con-
tinual spies upon their neighbours; which is a posture of war." Perhaps there
has never been a time when this description was more true than in our own
day, when men were more cruel to one another, and when persecution of
those who differ from the majority in race or language or religion was more
rife. All this makes it not easy to believe today in the reality of a single
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only by those rules that it had promulgated by its own volition, 43 re-
sulting in a natural conflict between sovereignty and international law.
This conflict raises serious challenges for the U.N., whose sovereign
member states purport to be bound by a "higher" law than that of the
international community."
B. The Concept of "International Law"
Nationalism, or the embodiment of sovereignty, has an uneasy co-
existence with international law today within the framework of the
U.N. The relationship works best when national interests are compat-
ible with interests of the larger international community.
The sources of modern international law are treaties, custom, gen-
eral principles of law, judicial precedents, text writers, and the notion
of "reason. '45  Sir Frederick Pollock theorized that the only
mandatory conditions for the existence of law are a political commu-
nity and its members' acknowledgment of established rules that bind
them in that community.46 Within this theoretical paradigm, interna-
tional law is a valid, workable concept.
International law, however, is weak-not because of the absence of
enforcement measures but because of the lack of authority and re-
spect for such measures.47 Institutions based on international law
have no legislature to maintain current law for the developing needs
of the international community, no legal executive enforcement
power, and the paucity of existing administrative bodies cannot ade-
quately handle the large amount of business that international law
produces.4 While mechanisms for the arbitration of disputes and an
world society, and it would be foolish to underrate the difficulties of creating
one.
Id. at 42-43.
43. See Head, supra note 30, at 619-20 ("[T]raditional international law had
evolved by the first part of the twentieth century into a body of rules that acknowl-
edged and supported the primacy of the nation-state and consisted only of those rules
that had been accepted by states, either by treaty or through practice. This regime
offered little or no room for entities other than states or for rules not 'emanat[ing]
from their own free will.' The sovereign independence of states had become the cen-
tral pillar of international law." (citation omitted)).
44. See U.N. Charter art. 2, 2 ("All Members, in order to ensure to all of them
the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obli-
gations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter."); see also Brierly,
supra note 38, at 16 (concluding that international lawyers face many problems be-
cause "if the premisses [sic] are correct[,] there is no escape from the conclusion that
international law is nothing but a delusion").
45. Brierly, supra note 38, at 56-68.
46. Id. at 71.
47. Il at 72. "It is not the existence of a police force that makes a system of law
strong and respected, but the strength of the law that makes it possible for a police
force to be effectively organized." Id.
48. Id. at 73.
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established court of justice exist, they have no enforcement power be-
cause their rulings are not compulsory.4 9
Internationalism has been defined as "world-wide co-operation [sic]
for the good of all nations,"5 0 a definition which naively assumes a
shared vision of universal welfare.51 To promote such a concept, na-
tions have formed organizations held together by "international law."
The first international organization to embrace this concept was the
League of Nations,5 2 established at the end of World War I.51 The
framers' of the League attempted to follow Woodrow Wilson's
dream of forming a world organization that would maintain global
peace and prevent aggression through combined national forces.55
Following Wilson's beliefs, they endeavored to fashion an organiza-
tion that would be dedicated to collective security and thus able to
ensure the peace better than the existing "balance-of-power poli-
tics."'5 6 The League made some progress towards this goal for a dec-
ade,s7 but when Japan invaded Manchuria, the organization was
unable to stop this invasion.58 As successive invasions occurred, 9 the
League was powerless to prevent the onset of World War H.1 The
final death of the League occurred when its officials left Geneva to
escape an expected invasion by Axis powers.61
The successor to the League is the current U.N., whose charter pro-
vides for an organization of states which voluntarily limit the extent of
their governments' actions.62 Jurists have described the U.N. Charter
"as a multilateral convention, a treaty that makes binding law,"' re-
flecting the framers' intent that U.N. rules act as legal obligations
49. Id.; see eg., Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14
(June 27) (holding that the United States must follow U.N. "laws"). The United
States, however, refused to appear before the World Court or recognize this decision.
50. Anjali V. Patil, The UN Veto in World Affairs 1946-1990: A Complete Record
and Case H-istories of the Security Council's Veto 3 (1992).
51. See infra part IV (discussing conflicts of interest between sovereign nations).
52. See infra part H.A (comparing collective security of the League of Nations
with that of the U.N.).
53. Goodrich et al., supra note 9, at 2.
54. Ironically, although President Woodrow Wilson initiated the League, the
United States did not join, leading to the organization's failure. Id
55. Id. at 2.
56. Janis, supra note 3, at 194.
57. Id. at 194-95 (noting that the League helped settle the 1925 dispute between
Greece and Bulgaria).
58. Id. at 195.
59. Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1934, and Germany invaded the Rhineland, Austria,
and Czechoslovakia between 1936 and 1938. Id
60. See infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
61. Id
62. Peter R. Baehr & Leon Gordenker, The United Nations in the 1990s, at 3 (2d
ed. 1994).
63. Id.
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binding member nations' governments.' 4 The framers of the Charter
ambitiously attempted to empower the U.N. to govern its members to
achieve the maintenance of world peace.65 Unfortunately, this ideal-
ized "empowerment" has not succeeded.66 Though the Charter re-
sembles documents providing for a unified "government," such as the
U.S. Constitution, it suffers difficulties when applying law to a body of
"independent sovereign states whose very existence implies the ab-
sence of general rules." 67
C. The Charter: A Codification of International Law
After World War II, the war-torn nations of the world, disgusted
with the death and destruction of the previous years, tried again 68 to
create an organization that would prevent such atrocities. 69 To further
this goal, the U.N. drafters, who convened in San Francisco for the
formidable task of creating the Charter, deemed that the primary driv-
ing principle of the U.N. would be "the sovereign equality of all...
Members. 70 The members pledged to maintain collectively, as the
foremost and overriding7' purpose of the organization, international
peace and security by eliminating threats to peace and arbitrating in-
ternational disputes.72 This collective security system was designed to
64. See U.N. Charter art. 2, 2; id. art. 94, 1 ("Each Member of the United
Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice
in any case to which it is a party.").
65. Baehr & Gordenker, supra note 62, at 2.
66. See, e.g., id. ("Despite earlier attempts to cope with this issue [of governing
sovereign nations] and despite nearly 50 years of practice by the United Nations, it
remains unresolved.").
67. Id. at 3.
68. See supra notes 130-41 and accompanying discussion on the League of
Nations.
69. See U.N. Charter pmbl.
70. Id. art. 2, 1; see infra part I.D (examining the alleged inequality of the Big
Five's veto power).
71. The order of the Purposes and Principles in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter
reflects a prioritized ranking, suggesting that the maintenance of international peace
and security is the primary purpose of the U.N. and takes priority over other pur-
poses. See Goodrich et al., supra note 9, at 25-26 (citing Certain Expenses of the
United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 213-15 (July 20) (separate opinion of Judge
Fitzmaurice)).
72. U.N. Charter art. 1.
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the
peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of inter-
national disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other
appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems
of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting
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be universal in its application: "a wronged state was to be protected
by all, and a wrongdoer punished by all." 3 Among other modali-
ties,74 Chapter VIP5 of the Charter provided for the preservation of
global peace through the use of collective force by the Security
Council.76
1. Chapter VII: Collective Security in the U.N.
Chapter VII is entitled "Action with Respect to Threats to the
Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression."'77 The draft-
ers never defined these phrases,7' however, and this has led to much
confusion in the international legal world79 and within the U.N.
itself.80
and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment
of these common ends.
Id.
73. Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law 702 (3d ed. 1991).
74. For a discussion of the six methods for maintaining international peace and
security that the drafters incorporated into the U.N. Charter, see George Y. Walker,
United States National Security Law and United Nations Peacekeeping or Peacemaking
Operations, 29 Wake Forest L Rev. 435, 450-70 (1994). Professor Walker categorizes
the six methods as (1) the resolution of the dispute by the contending nations them-
selves, (2) recommendations, calls for action, or decisions by the Security Council, (3)
actions by regional international organizations, (4) recommendations by the General
Assembly, (5) litigation before the International Court of Justice, or (6) action by the
Secretary General. Il
75. U.N. Charter arts. 39-51. But see id. art. 2, 4 ("All Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial in-
tegrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.").
76. Id. art. 24, 1.
In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its
Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the main-
tenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its
duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.
Id.; see also supra note 9. The Charter recommends that before military action is
taken, the member nations should try to settle their disputes by peaceful means, as
provided for in Chapter VL See infra notes 84-85 (text of U.N. Charter arts. 41-42).
77. U.N. Charter ch. VII.
78. Michael Akehurst, A Modem Introduction to International Law 219 (6th ed.
1987). Professor Akehurst indicates that "threats to the peace and breaches of the
peace" refer to international peace. Id
79. See e.g., Ibrahim J. Gassama, World Order in the Post-Cold War Era.: The
Relevance and Role of the United Nations After Fifty Years, 20 Brook. J. Int'l L 255,
266 (1994) ("Chapter VII of the UN Charter ... could be construed liberally to allow
the Security Council the right to treat practically any dispute as a threat to the
peace."); Roger K. Smith, The Legality of Coercive Arms Control, 19 Yale J. Int'l L
455, 459-60 (1994) (noting that the drafters did not offer precise definitions for these
Article 39 phrases).
80. See e.g., infra text accompanying note 217 (noting that during the Gulf War
invasion, the Security Council could not decide under which article of Chapter VII to
act).
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Chapter VII contains, inter alia, Articles 39-43, the mechanisms
under which the drafters envisioned the U.N. exercising its strength to
combat aggression. Article 39 grants the Security Council broad au-
thority to maintain international peace by the use of coercive arms
control.81 Every member nation maintains its inherent right of self-
defense' against an attack of aggression until the Security Council
has acted to protect that nation through measures provided by Article
39.
Within Chapter VII provisions, the drafters provided last-minute
safety measures to prevent the actual use of force: Article 4083 calls
for feuding parties to comply with provisional measures before the use
of force, and Article 4184 empowers the Council to use nonforce meas-
ures, such as economic sanctions. If the measures within Articles 40
and 41 prove fruitless, the Security Council finally may resort to the
use of force as authorized by Article 42.85 This article allows the
Council to elect to use force when they believe that Article 41 meas-
81. "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide
what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or
restore international peace and security." U.N. Charter art. 39.
82. Id. art. 51.
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary
to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members
in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to
the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and re-
sponsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore inter-
national peace and security.
Id.
83. Id. art. 40.
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council
may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures
provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with
such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provi-
sional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position
of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of
failure to comply with such provisional measures.
Id.
84. Id. art. 41.
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call
upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These
may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of
rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication,
and the severance of diplomatic relations.
Id.
85. Id. art. 42.
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article
41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations,
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ures would prove inadequate or if they have already proven
inadequate.86
Article 43 empowers the Security Council to make special agree-
ments with the member nations to supply armed forces, assistance,
and facilities.8r Article 43 is always read in conjunction with Article
42; if member nations make Article 43 agreements, the members are
obligated to take military action under Article 42 .ss
Articles 4889 and 4990 provide the Council with authority to require
the members to execute all Council decisions, including the making of
special agreements. Thus, the drafters intended that Article 43 special
agreements would bind the participating members when called upon
to use force to maintain world peace and security.91
2. The Drafting of Article 43
The drafters of the Charter considered three options for providing
the Security Council with armed troops to carry out its decisions
under Chapter VII enforcement measures. "2 The first idea was to set
up a truly international force which would have command over the
national armies and eventually, might actually replace them. 3 The
drafters in San Francisco rejected this option, just as the founders of
the League did. 4 The second option, originally considered under the
League, involved the enforcement of Council decisions by an ad hoc
coalition of national forces under an international command. 95 The
blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the
United Nations.
11L
86. Id.
87. Id. art. 43; see infra notes 92-109 and accompanying text on the drafting of
Article 43.
88. See Akehurst, supra note 78, at 222; Goodrich et al., supra note 9, at 316; Ni..
White, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security
85 (1990).
89. U.N. Charter art. 48.
1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council
for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all
the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security
Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Na-
tions directly and through their action in the appropriate international agen-
cies of which they are members.
Id.
90. Id. art. 49 ("The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual
assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.").
91. Compare i& art. 2, 2 (obligating member states to comply with Charter) with
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14, 99-100 (June 27) (a
World Court decision with which the United States refused to comply).
92. Goodrich et al., supra note 9, at 317.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 318.
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drafters rejected this too and settled on the third option, whereby
member nations96 would supply national contingents based on prior
special agreements defining the number of forces and other types of
assistance. 7 The drafters left the phrase "special agreement or agree-
ments" vague as well as the actual timing of when the agreements
would begin to be employed.9s Thus, from the beginning, Article 43
lacked clarity and, consequently, enforceability. 9
The lack of clarity in Article 43 foreshadowed the future relations
among the permanent members of the Security Council regarding
their commitment to taking combined military action to preserve
peace. Between 1946 and 1947, the Security Council instructed the
U.N.'s Military Staff Committee to define Article 43 in military
terms.' Although the members of the Committee agreed upon a few
areas,1 1 much disagreement occurred between the Soviet Union on
one side and the other permanent members on the other."° One ma-
jor area of contention was the size of the forces contributed by the
permanent members. The Soviet Union wanted each member to con-
tribute equal numbers of troops as well as equally sophisticated ma-
chinery.' 3 The other members favored contributions relative to the
size and composition of each of their domestic forces. 1' 4 Disagree-
ment also occurred over the contribution of bases, the location of
forces, and the withdrawal of such forces following completion of their
assignment.'0 5
These problems highlighted the growing tension in the Security
Council and between the Soviet Union and the United States.' 6 Iron-
96. The Charter architects planned that the permanent members would supply the
majority of the forces. Id. at 319.
97. Id. at 318.
98. See infra part IV (examining the reality that the agreements have never been
implemented).
99. See, e.g., Franck, supra note 1, at 52, 150-65 (recognizing that a rule must be
clear and coherent to gain legitimacy, which leads to enforceability).
100. Goodrich et al., supra note 9, at 319-20.
101. The members agreed to the extent of the composition (air, sea, and land), the
basic strength of the forces ("sufficient strength to enable the Security Council to take
prompt action in any part of the world"), and the size ("influenced by the great 'moral
weight and potential power' behind any Council decision"). Goodrich et al., supra
note 9, at 320. The drafters also agreed that all members would have the obligation to
contribute forces to the agreements. Id. Initially, the permanent members would con-
tribute the majority of the forces; other members would contribute additional forces
as necessary. Id. The drafters agreed that the respective nations would command
their forces, except when the Security Council would take control. At this point, the
Military Staff Committee (Articles 36, 37, and 38) would guide their tactical
maneuverings. Id at 321.
102. Id. at 321-22.
103. See id. at 321.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 322.
106. Id. at 323.
212 [Vol. 64
1995] U.N. ARTICLE 43 SPECIAL AGREEMENTS
icafly,10 7 the United States wanted to enforce peace throughout the
world with a large quick-acting, mobile force, while the Soviets pre-
ferred a smaller force to combat aggression and maintain peace.1-3
Secretary General Hammarskjold, along with the majority of the
members of the Committee, felt that a standing U.N. force was "un-
necessary and impractical.' ' 1 9 The Military Staff Committee contin-
ued to meet "but only as a matter of form."" 0 Thus, the permanent
members attempted to settle their disagreements but failed to do
so.111
D. The Political Check on Enforcement Action: The Veto
The most controversial debate among the Charter drafters con-
cerned the "veto" power 12 given to the Security Council's five perma-
nent members. 13 The major powers were in favor of the veto, but
many member states were opposed, cognizant that the League failed
due to a lack of unanimity." 4 Those nations were unwilling to repeat
the futility of the League.
The Security Council's permanent members made it clear to the
other members of the conference that without a veto power, the U.N.
would not exist." 5 They insisted upon the veto because they antici-
pated their role as the principal suppliers of the men and materiel in
any military action. 1 6 Without the veto, they felt that the Security
Council would be weakened." 7 In addition, the veto ensured against
107. See infra part IV.C.1 (commenting that the Clinton administration is signifi-
cantly scaling back U.S. participation in the U.N.).
108. Goodrich et al., supra note 9, at 323.
109. Id. at 325-26.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 324.
112. U.N. Charter art. 27.
1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made
by an affirmative vote of nine members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by
an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the
permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and
under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from
voting.
Id.
113. Ruth B. Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter 713 (1958).
114. Id. at 716-17.
115. Id. at 713.
116. Id. at 723. Had the unanimity requirement been "abandoned in enforcement
decisions, it maintained, the permanent members of the Council, 'representing the
bulk of the military and industrial power of the world,' could be involved 'by the votes
of states commanding but a fraction of that power' in a course of action ending in
military sanctions." Id. at 723 (quoting a draft, jointly prepared by the Big Five, inter-
preting the voting formula) (citation omitted).
117. Patil, supra note 50, at 12 ("Starting from the premise that everyone desired to
make the Security Council a strong and effective organ, there was no choice but to
support the rule of unanimity as essential for its strength and effectiveness. The alter-
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a third world war because unanimous accord by the permanent mem-
bers theoretically would translate into the elimination of huge rival
alliances of the world's "super powers." 118 The permanent members
also wanted the veto to safeguard their individual interests, protecting
them from adverse proposals advanced by the other permanent
members." 9
Although critics understood the reasons for wanting the veto
power, they correctly predicted that it would stymie the Security
Council's ability to enforce its mandate similar to the failed League.12 0
Thus, even before its birth, the U.N. faced a conundrum: it recognized
that the veto was a potential hazard to the true objectives of the or-
ganization, but it also knew that it would never come into existence
without the veto.
The permanent members justified their veto power as lenient by
comparison to the veto in the League.' 2 ' In reality, the veto power
was extensive even under the most restrictive reading of the Charter.
native was a voting system which, though it might be more perfect, could in a given
moment, weaken the Council in its efforts to act promptly and effectively. The Chi-
nese delegation felt that its choice was clear between a utopian system of voting and
one requiring unanimity for effective decisions." (quoting Doc. 922, III/1/44, June 12,
1945, at 5, statement of the representative from China)).
118. Id. ("The veto power was a means of preserving that unanimity, and far from
being a menace to the small Powers, it was their essential safeguard. Without that
unanimity, all countries, large and small, would fall victims to the establishment of
gigantic rival blocs which might clash in some future Armageddon. Co-operation
among the Great Powers was the only escape from this peril; nothing else was of
comparable importance." (quoting Doc. 936, III/1/45, June 12, 1945, at 4, statement of
the representative of the United Kingdom)).
119. Id. at 11.
120. Secondary nations recognized the futility of the veto power. During the San
Francisco convention, Colombia pronounced that it would vote against the veto,
based on principle and because "politically it would produce inaction rather than
unity." Russell, supra note 113, at 737. Even members of the permanent powers ac-
knowledged the danger of the veto. Senator Vandenberg wrote in his private
memoirs:
This "veto" [business] is making it very difficult to maintain any semblance
of the fiction of "sovereign equality" among the nations.... It is fully justi-
fied in respect to the use of force because the Powers with the "veto" will be
the Powers which must largely furnish the force. But it is immoral and in-
defensible.., in any other application. But the irony of the situation is that
the greater the extent of the "veto," the more impossible it becomes for the
new League to involve America in anything against our own will.
Id. at 725-26 (quoting Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., The Private Papers of Sena-
tor Vandenberg 200 (1952)).
121. See Russell, supra note 113, at 717-18, 727. The British delegate to the San
Francisco convention elaborated:
So that really what it amounts to. . . is that by [these] proposals.., we are
taking away the right of veto from the secondary Powers while retaining it
for the permanent members. That may be considered to be unequal treat-
ment. It may be considered to be undesirable, but I would like to submit
that it is not entirely unreasonable.... Now I don't see why, simply because
we have admittedly deprived the secondary Powers on the Council of their
right to veto, why because of that a permanent member should exercise the
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Each permanent member could bar any Council decision that would
involve either preventive or coercive action against any other nation
that it desired to protect. The Charter thus granted the Big Five "a
privileged status above the law."'" The Charter did not allow them to
threaten or use force in any manner inconsistent with the U.N.'s pur-
poses, but the formal mechanism of the veto implicitly permitted the
permanent members to evaluate all decisions involving Council action
according to their best interests.' 3 Thus, the Charter accorded to the
permanent members a power flagrantly incompatible with the princi-
ple of equality before the law.'" Furthermore, the amendment pro-
cess12 additionally protected them from any undesirable meddling
with this privilege; "[v]eto guarded veto.""*
Although the drafters at San Francisco passed Article 27 without
objection, the smaller powers approved it begrudgingly. As one com-
mentator noted, "[The veto debate] was not, in the last degree, a ques-
tion of the rule of unanimity... it was a question of... a new world
organization or no world organization.. . And that organization...
[was] more important than any condition."12 7 The nations who were
not permanent members of the Security Council realized that without
the veto, the U.N. would never exist.
II. THE U.S.'s DELEGATION OF FORCE TO AN
INTERNATIONAL BODY
The political problem of independent nations transferring the dele-
gation of authority over their military forces to an external unified
entity existed long before the creation of the Charter. This part exam-
ines the legal background that predated the ratification of the Charter,
the meaning that the U.S. Congress imputed to the Article 43 special
agreements during the Charter debates, and the enactment of the
U.N.P.A.' 8
right of veto, which he retains, any more recklessly or disgracefully under
this Charter than he could do under the Covenant of the League.
Id at 727.
122. Patil, supra note 50, at 16.
123. Id.
124. 1&
125. Article 108 lays out the amendment process:
Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members
of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds
of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with
their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the
United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security
Council.
U.N. Charter art. 108.
126. Patil, supra note 50, at 16.
127. Russell, supra note 113, at 742 (statement of Tom Connally, quoted in Tom
Connally, My Name is Tom Connally 163-79 (1954)).
128. See supra note 23.
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A. A Theoretical Acceptance of Collective Security
Both in the domestic and international arenas, the distinction be-
tween authorization of force and obligation to commit forces is as crit-
ical historically as it is legally. The domestic problem with these two
ideas centers upon the distribution of war powers between Congress
and the President.129 The international problem deals with collective
security, a method of maintaining global peace through combining
military forces of various nations.
The tension between authorizing versus obligating force began
before the creation of the Charter.3 0 During the drafting of the Cov-
enant of the League of Nations ("Covenant"), France suggested estab-
lishing an international force consisting of national troops which the
Council of the League would have at the League's disposal to aid in
executing its decisions and overcoming any forces opposed to it.'
3
'
Neither the British nor the Americans, however, wanted to form an
international force to assist in keeping the peace.132
The Covenant contained language suggesting that the League might
obligate member states to use armed force without their specific ap-
proval.' 33 This possibility contributed directly to the Senate's rejec-
tion of the Covenant. Forces led by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge
proposed a reservation'3 that would have mandated congressional
approval for any use of American forces under the League's power.'
31
President Wilson, however, opposed the Lodge reservation and, as a
result of such opposition, could not gather the requisite two-thirds
vote for Senate consent to join the League of Nations.' 36
The League failed to maintain world peace primarily because the
appeal of collective security was significantly less important than the
individual nations' desires to protect their national interests. 37 The
129. See infra part H.B; supra note 22.
130. See Zeidan, supra note 6, at 2.
131. Id.; see Goodrich et al., supra note 9, at 323.
132. Zeidan, supra note 6, at 2.
133. Michael J. Glennon, The UN Security Council Can't Substitute for Congress,
Christian Sci. Monitor, Dec. 20, 1990, at 19.
134. The reservation stated:
The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity
or political independence of any other country or to interfere in controver-
sies between nations - whether members of the league or not - under the
provisions of article 10, or to employ the military or naval forces of the
United States under any article of the treaty for any purpose, unless in any
particular case the Congress, which, under the Constitution, has the sole
power to declare war or authorize the employment of the military or naval
forces of the United States, shall by act or joint resolution so provide.
58 Cong. Rec. 8777 (1919).
135. Id
136. See id.
137. White, supra note 88, at 3. Nations' interest or membership in the League was
fleeting: U.S. Congress had no interest in the League's collective security; the Soviet
Union joined in 1934, before the collapse of the League; Japan left the League after
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U.S.'s refusal to join the League exemplified this protectionism and
showed, for the first time since the League's conception, that a power-
ful state thought that collective security did not address its needs.'1 S
Such considerations of national interests resulted in the diminution of
the League's power to such an extent that questions regarding the im-
position of sanctions were no longer subject to consideration of the
League's central governmental bodies, as had been planned, but to
each individual member's concerns for its own ends. 39 The League's
inability to use collective measures against aggressors led to its
collapse. 4 °
Despite the failure of the League,' 4 the victorious Allies of the Sec-
ond World War attempted again to establish an international entity
based on collective security. This time, the United States did not re-
ject the resultant U.N. Charter.142 One of the critical components of
the Charter is the Article 43 requirement that member nations make
national armed forces available to the Security Council.143 The para-
dox' 44 inherent in Article 43 is precisely the same weakness that ulti-
mately caused the downfall of the League of Nations. 141 Many
asserting its national interest by invading Manchuria, against the League's principles;
Italy withdrew after asserting its national interests through the invasion of Ethiopia,
also against League mandates; and Germany quit once the Nazi's began ruling. See
Baehr & Gordenker, supra note 62, at 12-13. Clearly, the Nazi's expansionist plans
violated the ideals of collective security and world peace. The League also could not
be an effective "world" organization because of its ideological slant, resulting in the
barring of the U.S.S.R. from membership. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign Policy
Since World War II 271 (1985). The League founders created the organization to
sustain an international system founded upon "capitalism and colonialism and epito-
mized the antithesis of the world revolution and anticolonialism propagated by Soviet
and Comintern leaders." Id. This barring of the U.S.S.R. from the League set the
tone for the Soviet attitude toward the U.N. IL
138. White, supra note 88, at 3. Ironically, President Wilson was one of the states-
men who envisioned that the League would supplant the former balance of power
system with a unified organization made of strong nations "who shall be the trustees
of the peace of the world." Id.
139. Id. at 4.
140. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
141. As war and unrest began in Europe in the mid-1930's, the League became
paralyzed. Patil, supra note 50, at 3-4. The League existed until 1946, when the mem-
ber nations dissolved it and transferred its property and assets to the U.N. See Gas-
sama, supra note 79, at 256 n.4.
142. The Senate advised and consented to the U.N. Charter on June 28, 1945. 91
Cong. Rec. 8189-90 (1945).
143. See supra note 8 (text of U.N. Charter art. 43).
144. This paradox refers to the necessity of having Article 43 in the U.N. Charter to
give the Charter enforcement strength and thus, as noted below, for the passage of
the Charter in 1945. Article 43, however, has never been implemented. See discussion
infra part m.
145. Secretary of State Cordell Hull said, "The biggest stumbling block that sent
the Wilson movement in support of the League to utter destruction in 1920 was the
argument [over armed forces dedicated to an international organization], and no
other political controversy during our time had been accompanied by more deep-
seated antagonism." 2 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull 1662 (1948).
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senators recognized, however, the importance of Article 43 in securing
world peace. As one Senator noted:
[T]here has never been in all the history of time an article like this
one. This is an innovation in the field of international law .... This
makes the Charter more than a debating society as was the League
of Nations. Here is something that has teeth to keep the peace of
the world.' 46
Thus, in theory, the Senate in 1945 accepted the idea of international
collective security.
B. U.N. Article 43 Special Agreements and the Constitution
While in theory many senators may have accepted the idea of U.S.
troops participating in an international military contingent, a problem
arose in trying to harmonize such "special agreements" with the U.S.
constitutional framework. 147 The age-old question of the division of
war powers between the U.S. executive and legislative branches
reared its head during both the Charter ratification and the passage of
the U.N.P.A.148 This tension underscored the fundamental problem:
while the U.S. government may have wanted to embrace a system of
collective security during this war-stricken era,'149 American policy
and history as a sovereign nation stood in the way of this legal ideal.
1. Congressional Enactment of the Charter
The U.S. Constitution confers military powers to two branches of
the federal government. Congress has the power to declare war, raise
and support armies, provide and maintain a navy, and make rules for
the regulation of those armed forces. 50 The Constitution also
designates the President as the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. armed
forces.15  General agreement exists that the President cannot single-
146. 91 Cong. Rec. 8021 (1945) (statement of Sen. Lucas). Furthermore, Senator
Chavez concluded that "collective action to curb the aggressor seems to be the only
answer to this problem. If we must inevitably participate in the armed settlement of
international disputes, then we should certainly participate in the cooperative action
to prevent them." Id. at 7958.
147. See id. at 7957 (statement of Sen. Vandenberg) (discussing the special agree-
ments in light of the constitutional vesting of authority to declare war in the Congress,
while at the same time vesting unlimited authority to use armed forces in the
President).
148. See infra part II.B.1-2.
149. Isolationism was the United States' way of life for a century and a half. Arthur
Schlesinger Jr., Whatever Happened to the New World Order?, Daily Yoniuri, May 30,
1994, at 6 ("Internationalism was a two-year Wilsonian aberration."). To avoid a re-
lapse into isolationism, Roosevelt demanded that the U.N.'s initial meeting occur
while the war was continuing, and thus, U.S. citizens would still be in an "internation-
alist mood." Id.
150. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-14.
151. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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handedly begin a war but may use force to combat sudden attacks on
the United States or its armed forces."
The most important issue that arose during the congressional dis-
cussions on the ratification of the Charter was the roles of the execu-
tive and legislative branches with respect to the Article 43
agreements. 153 The majority of senators affirmed their understanding
that congressional approval, and not executive agreements, would be
required to implement the special agreements committing U.S. forces
to the Security Council."5 This understanding signified the reluctance
of the senators to relinquish their control over the armed forces. As
Senator Wheeler noted, "What the people of this country want before
our boys fight all over the world is the right to say something about
where they are to fight and where they are to die."'1 55
The nature of the special agreements also factored into the debate
on "police action"' 56 versus war. The language of Article 43 states
that a special agreement would designate the "numbers and types of
forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature
of the facilities and assistance to be provided" to the Security Coun-
cil. 57 This language led to some debate in the Senate as to the exact
152. Jane E. Stromseth, Rethinking War Powers: Congress, the President, and the
United Nations, 81 Geo. LJ. 597, 597 (1993).
153. See 91 Cong. Rec. 7957 (1945) (statement of Sen. Vandenberg, a participant in
the U.N. Charter conference at San Francisco). Senator Vandenberg elaborated:
[The charter] says that our agreement covering the contribution of troops to
any joint action must be approved by our own constitutional process ....
The charter actually confirms our constitutional process. We shall decide for
ourselves where we wish to draw the line, if any, between the constitutional
authority of the President to use our armed forces in preliminary national
defense action and the constitutional authority of Congress to declare war.
Both [c]onstitutional rights have existed... and have stood unchallenged for
150 years. We have never thought it necessary or desirable to try to set
metes and bounds for each. I doubt if it is necessary or desirable now. We
have but to continue the constitutional practice of a century and a halt
It
154. Senator Vandenberg emphatically stated
I can understand how there might be advanced a perfectly legitimate argu-
ment as to whether or not constitutional process at that point referred to a
joint resolution of Congress or a treaty action by the Senate, although it is
the latter which I favor. But I cannot understand how there could ever be
any possible defense of the suggestion that this could be done by an execu-
tive agreement which denies a partnership authority on the part of the repre-
sentatives of the American people.
Id. at 7991; see also id. at 8000 (statement by Sen. Vandenberg) ("It seems to me
that the important thing to underscore and to underline is that we all agree that this
cannot be done by executive agreement if it eliminates the voice of Congress or the
voice of the Senate from the equation.").
155. 1& at 7988 (statement by Sen. Wheeler).
156. "Police action" is a political term of art referring to a military action which
involves less forces than a war. See Stromseth, supra note 152, at 608. This term of art
has been abused, however, as exemplified by the "police action" in Korea. See infra
part fI.A (discussing the military action in Korea).
157. U.N. Charter art. 43.
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limits Congress could place on the special agreements. The senators
could not agree on whether Congress could limit the location or par-
ticipation of U.S. troops committed to the U.N. under Article 43.158
Senator Connally, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, thought that any limits on the provision of troops under the spe-
cial agreements would "violat[e] the spirit of the Charter... because
the assumption is that we will make agreements to furnish troops in
good faith for the use of the Security Council wherever danger may be
present, and wherever the threat of war may be present."' 59 While no
one could predict precisely the number of troops that would be called
under a special agreement, most senators thought the number would
be small.' 6
The debate between police action and war then focused on the divi-
sion of war powers between the President and the Congress as it af-
fected the maintenance of sovereignty over the U.S. forces. 16' Several
senators favored a reservation to the Charter that would mandate
congressional approval for each use of American special agreement
forces. One senator argued that anything less would unconstitution-
ally delegate congressional war powers to "one man"-the U.S. dele-
gate to the Security Council, a presidential appointee.' 62 Senator
Bushfield also objected "to a delegation of power to one man or to the
Security Council... to declare war and to take American boys into
war."'163 Another congressman, however, argued that the special
agreements would not impair
158. See, e.g., 91 Cong. Rec. 7987-92 (1945) (discussing Congress' ability to modify
versus merely accept special agreements).
159. kld at 7987 (statement of Sen. Connally). Note that Senator Connally assumes
the use of the special agreement forces will be for a "war" or threat thereof.
160. The Charter of the United Nations: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on For-
eign Relations, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 653 (1945) (statement of Sen. Millikin) ("[I]t
seems to me that the initial force to support this plan would be nominal-let us call
them-police forces."). John Foster Dulles testified for the Truman Administration:
"My opinion is that the amount of military force required to make up these cont-
ingents ought to be very small for as far as anyone can predict reasonably ahead." Id.
at 654.
161. See, e.g., 91 Cong. Rec. 7987 (1945) ("It seems to me that... you have ... a
policing problem, and later on you might come to a real war problem, and that draws
a logical distinction between where the power might lie in this country to order troops
into action as against one or the other of those two contingencies; in other words, it
seems to me that possibly we can preserve and effectuate the constitutional power of
the Congress and the power of the President depending upon the nature of the prob-
lem. The policing powers traditionally exercised by the President might possibly be
kept in mind, and the war powers might be kept in Congress, thus preserving in sym-
metry all of the constitutional powers of the Congress and the President.") (Sen. Mil-
likin quoted by Sen. Wheeler).
162. Id. at 7992 (statement of Sen. Wheeler) ("I am opposed to giving any one man
the power to put us into war.").
163. Id. at 7156 (statement of Sen. Bushfield). The Senate finally approved a lim-
ited delegation of U.S. forces to the Security Council through Article 43 special agree-
ments when protected by the U.S. veto. Stromseth, supra note 152, at 608. The
Senators felt this was a constitutional arrangement first because Congress would ap-
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our sovereignty... because the concurring vote of the United States
will be required before our forces can be called upon by the Coun-
cil. The power of the Congress to declare war is not impaired be-
cause only through a declaration of war can our total resources be
pledged to war."
As recent history has shown, however, the United States has not for-
mally declared "war" since World War II and, thus, has not invoked
the powers of Congress to declare war.16 Because the Senate con-
templated U.N. "police action" to be premised on the passage of spe-
cial agreements approved by Congress,'6 "contemporary claims that
American troops can be used in any U.N. authorized military action,
regardless of its size, without any prior congressional approval, would
have surprised the Seventy-Ninth Congress."167
Fimally, many senators expressed their concern over the obligations
the United States would undertake by ratifying the Charter. The sen-
ators did agree that by ratifying the Charter, the United States was
entering into an international obligation."6 The senators realized that
Article 43 would obligate the United States to enter into an agree-
ment with the Security Council to designate at least a small number of
troops for U.N. sanctioned enforcement action.169 The converse of
prove any special agreement and second because these forces would be involved only
in a limited-fashion in U.N.-authorized "police actions" versus their full-scale engage-
ment in "war." I&
164. lit at 8031 (statement of Sen. Lucas).
165. See discussion infra part I. Also note that this distinction between the Presi-
dent's police powers and Congress' war powers concerned Senators at this time:
In discussion of these subjects the question is always raised, where does the
power of the President to conduct policing operations end, and where does
the power of Congress to make war and to supply and maintain our military
forces begin? There has been a no-man's land which has never been elimi-
nated by an acceptable definition.
91 Cong. Rec. 8032-33 (1945) (statement of Sen. Mfillilin). Senator Millikin then went
on to propose that as these special agreements are adopted, the Congress, through
experience, will define the limits on the forces to be used for policing operations by
the President. Id- at 8033. Since the Security Council has never made Article 43
agreements, Congress has not had the opportunity to make this delineation between
police action and war.
166. As one Senator observed:
Enforcement action under the [Charter will involve only the forces pledged
under these special agreements, while war, on the other hand, when declared
by Congress, would amount to a complete break-down in international rela-
tions, and a decision to devote the total resources of the United States to
securing the safety of this country.
91 Cong. Rec. 8030 (1945) (statement of Sen. Lucas).
167. Stromseth, supra note 152, at 612.
168. In response to defining the meaning of the phrase "on its call," Senator
George responded, "There is the international obligation... undoubtedly... taken
upon our part which cannot be whittled away or watered down by any subsequent
action of Congress unless we repudiate the treaty." 91 Cong. Rec. 8024 (1945) (state-
ment by Sen. George).
169. See, e.g., id. at 8030 (statement by Sen. Lucas) ("[W]hen the Senate ratifies this
charter with article 43 contained in it, the result is to impose upon the United States
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this obligation, however, is that without the agreements, no number of
forces could be pledged because there would have been no consensus
on the number of troops. 7 °
2. Congressional Enactment of the U.N. Participation Act
To ensure that Article 43 would not override the constitutional divi-
sion of war powers between the legislative and executive branches, the
U.S. Senate enacted the U.N.P.A. in 1945.'71 The U.N.P.A. allowed
Congress to give the U.N. Security Council a limited amount of mili-
tary forces for quick action while still maintaining Congress' war pow-
ers in larger actions. The U.N.P.A. designates that the U.S.
representative to the U.N. must vote according to the President's di-
rections, 72 and the President must tell Congress about any Security
Council resolutions to use military action.
17 3
The Senate debates on the passage of the U.N.P.A. were more con-
tentious than those of the Charter ratification, which occurred a few
months earlier. The beginning of the Cold War led many senators to
have strong apprehensions about entrusting the authority to decide
the terms of deployment of U.S. armed forces to a Security Council
seating a sole American ambassador amidst ten foreign representa-
tives.'7  In addition, the debate on war powers resumed.175 The
U.N.P.A. contains a section that addresses the war powers balance.
176
an obligation to contribute forces necessary to the maintenance of international peace
and security. The exact terms of this obligation are to be determined by an agreement
to be negotiated later, but nevertheless the basic fundamental obligation to contribute
forces is created by this charter.").
170. See id.
171. United Nations Participation Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 264, §§ 1-7, 59 Stat. 619
(1949) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 287-287e (1988)).
172. 22 U.S.C. § 287a (1988).
173. Id. § 287b.
174. See Charles Ernest Edgar, United States Use of Armed Force Under the United
Nations... Who's in Charge?, 10 J.L. & Pol. 299, 300-01 (1994) (citing 91 Cong. Rec.
11,396 (1945) (statement of Sen. Wheeler)).
175. See supra note 22 (defining division or balance of war powers between the
President and Congress).
176. This section authorizes the President to negotiate an Article 43 agreement
with the U.N. Security Council which would be "subject to the approval of the Con-
gress by appropriate Act or joint resolution." See 22 U.S.C. § 287d (1988).
Furthermore,
The President shall not be deemed to require the authorization of the Con-
gress to make available to the Security Council on its call in order to take
action under article 42 of said Charter and pursuant to such special agree-
ment or agreements the armed forces, facilities, or assistance provided for
therein.
Id. For a debate on the implications of the constitutionality of deploying forces to
international armies, compare Michael J. Glennon, Agora: The Gulf Crisis in Interna-
tional and Foreign Relations Law, The Constitution and Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter, 85 Am. J. Int'l L. 74 (1991) (arguing that the only way for the Presi-
dent to deploy forces to U.N. armies without the approval of Congress is under the
terms of an Article 43 agreement and because no such agreements exist, such unilat-
[Vol. 64
1995] U.N. ARTICLE 43 SPECIAL AGREEMENTS
The U.N.P.A. attempts to clarify any delegation of authority to the
President: "[N]othing herein contained shall be construed as an au-
thorization to the President by the Congress to make available to the
Security Council for such purpose armed forces, facilities, or assist-
ance in addition to the forces, facilities, and assistance provided for in
such special agreement or agreements."'" Thus, the United States
could provide the U.N. with limited military force through special
agreements as provided for in Article 43 of the Charter. Congress,
however, would have to approve every special agreement, and, if the
Security Council called for forces beyond the limits of the agreement,
Congress retained its constitutional power to declare war.' 1
Congress amended the U.N.P.A. in 1949, limiting the activities of
U.S. forces by decreeing that U.S. personnel may only be used in sup-
port of U.N. activities "specifically directed to the peaceful settlement
of disputes and not involving the employment of armed forces con-
templated by Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter."' 79 The
amended act also provided that the President may commit U.S. troops
only to "serve as observers, guards, or in any non-combatant capac-
ity."' 80 Finally, the amendment set a definitive limit on the number of
troops, stating that "in no event shall more than a total of one thou-
sand of such personnel be so detailed at any one time."'' Interest-
ingly, the military actions in Korea, Kuwait, and Haiti, in which U.S.
Presidents engaged American troops under the auspices of a U.N. ac-
tion, do not conform to Congress' stated intentions as embodied in the
U.N.P.A.
III. CASE HISTORIES AND THE NONEXISTENCE OF ARTICLE 43
SPECIAL AGREEMENTS
The opportunity to make Article 43 special agreements arose dur-
ing the Cold War and post-Cold War eras in the military actions in
Korea, Kuwait, Haiti, and Bosnia, but no member nation concluded
any agreements. The presidents did not designate forces in conjunc-
tion with Article 43 agreements or the U.N.P.A. and thus ignored the
eral deployments are unconstitutional) with Franck and Patel, supra note 12 (arguing
that the Senate's ratification of the U.N. Charter provides constructive consent for the
President's decision, through his Security Council representative, to deploy American
forces to enforce Security Council resolutions).
177. 22 U.S.C. § 287d.
178. 91 Cong. Rec. 10,965-67 (1945) (statement of Sen. Connally); Id. at 10,967,
10,975 (statement of Sen. Vandenberg); see also Schlesinger, supra note 149, at 6 (not-
ing that Congress intended all special agreements, that is, commitments of American
troops for U.N. actions, to be reviewed by Congress).
179. Act of Oct. 10, 1945, Pub. L. No. 341, 63 Stat. 734-36 (1949) (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. § 287d-1 (1988)).
180. 1&
181. Id.
223
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desires of the Seventy-Ninth Congress for commitment of U.S. troops
in U.N. enforcement actions. 182
In both eras when they felt national interests may be compromised,
U.S. presidents have used the "authority" extended to them via Secur-
ity Council resolutions to commit U.S. forces to military combat with-
out Congress' prior consent. When no national interests were
involved, the president did not volunteer U.S. troops for combat. This
part examines the case histories of Korea, Kuwait, Haiti, and Bosnia
to address why the Security Council failed to implement Article 43
special agreements.
A. The Cold War: Korea
From 1945-1953, the Cold War and the resulting polarization of
political alliances dominated the world scene.183 Beginning with the
first Security Council session in January 1946, the other members
chastised the Soviet Union for failing to withdraw Soviet troops from
Iran in accordance with a treaty among Iran, Britain, and the
U.S.S.R."&4 As a result, Moscow saw itself in an isolated, minority
position within the U.N.185 This situation confirmed the Soviet
Union's original inclinations; it had joined the U.N. as an accommoda-
tion rather than because of its belief in the organization's effectiveness
as a stabilizing global entity. 8 6 As a result, the Soviet Union vetoed
anything that would compromise its hegemony? 87
Because the permanent members of the Security Council, particu-
larly the Soviet Union and the United States, could not agree on the
basic principles to govern an international force, member states and
the Council never concluded any Article 43 agreements. Therefore,
when the Security Council determined in June 1950 that Korea had
182. See Stromseth, supra note 152, at 620. Professor Stromseth notes that almost
everyone was convinced that the members of the U.N. would negotiate special agree-
ments quickly. Id. at 620 n.117. When one Senator raised the possibility of the ab-
sence of such agreements, 91 Cong. Rec. 8024 (1945) (statement of Sen. Tunnell),
another responded, "when we ratify this Charter... we are legally and morally bound
to furnish forces of some kind or character to help keep the peace of the world." 91
Cong. Rec. 8024 (1945) (statement of Sen. Lucas).
183. Rubinstein, supra note 137, at 273.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 272 ("[The Soviet Union's] aim was to ensure that the League's suc-
cessor would not become an anti-Soviet alliance; and its participation was predicated
on the assumption that the United Nations would function primarily to handle polit-
ical and security problems .... ").
187. Id. at 273. The U.S.S.R. approved the Charter only after the inclusion of the
veto power in the Security Council. Id. at 272. As of April 1987, the veto was used 56
times by the United States, 114 times by the Soviet Union, 29 times by Britain, 16
times by France, and three times by China. Franck, supra note 1, at 177. By 1992, the
member states employed the veto another 61 times. See Agenda for Peace, supra note
16, 14; see also infra part IV (discussing the effects of the veto power).
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breached the peace, the U.N. did not have military forces immediately
available.188
The military forces the U.N. needed to intervene in Korea became
available, however, when the Soviet Union made the tactical error of
walking out of the Security Council, the General Assembly, and other
U.N. bodies in protest over the seating of the Republic of China as the
Chinese representative."s The Soviet Union incorrectly felt that its
absence prevented any Security Council actions on substantive mat-
ters. This belief proved to be without foundation, and the Korean po-
lice action represented a "historical aberration" that will never be
repeated.19°
The Soviet Union's absence made the U.N.'s first enforcement ac-
tion possible, enabling the United States to use the Security Council
to legitimatize its goal of containing communism wherever it
threatened to expand. The Truman Administration's claim that the
Security Council justified the American decision to use force was
circuitous. Professor Jane Stromseth recognized this problem: "Tru-
man decided to take military action in response to the North Korean
attack and announced his decisions before the Council even voted to
authorize force, both to avoid a Soviet veto and to assure the Council
that its resolution would be implemented."1 91 Thus, the Security
Council declared North Korea's aggression illegal and "recom-
mended" that members should help South Korea.'9 Resolution 84
then followed, specifically recommending that member states allocat-
ing forces make them "available to a unified command under the
United States of America."1 93
Even if the climate was conducive for employing Article 43, such
agreements were not necessary because the United States, at the com-
mand of its executive branch, preempted any collective security by its
unilateral actions. The United States controlled almost the entire ac-
tion under the auspices of U.N. approval. 94 The resolutions passed,
188. See Zeidan, supra note 6, at 7-8.
189. See White, supra note 88, at 86; Rubinstein, supra note 137, at 72 (noting that
the Soviet Union's absence allowed the Security Council to act in Korea based on
U.S.'s requests).
190. See White, supra note 88, at 86 (quoting J.F. Murphy, The United Nations and
the Control of International Violence 124 (1985)).
191. Stromseth, supra note 152, at 638.
192. George F. Will, Sovereignty and Sophistry, Wash. Post, Apr. 11, 1993, at C7.
The Soviet absence allowed the Council adoption of Resolution 83 on June 27, 1950,
which recommended that members furnish armed assistance to South Korea. White,
supra note 88, at 86.
193. White, supra note 88, at 86 (quoting S.C. Res. 84,5 U.N. SCOR Resolutions 5
(1950)).
194. See Anthony Goodman, U.N. to Consider Enforcement Role, Phila. Inquirer,
June 21, 1992, at D15. Although General MacArthur commanded "U.N. forces,"
ninety percent of the non-South Korean forces were American, and MacArthur never
reported to the Security Council. Will, supra note 192, at C7. The Security Council
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but the Security Council did not claim to bind members to render mil-
itary aid, a requirement which in the absence of Article 43 agreements
is practically impossible.' 95 Thus, the wording of these nonbinding
resolutions did not qualify as the equivalent of the "on call" phrase of
Article 43 requiring military troops.1 96 As a consequence, in the do-
mestic arena, the U.N. resolution did not trigger a congressional re-
sponse under the U.N.P.A. because the U.N.P.A. is contingent on the
making of the special agreements in the U.N., the international
arena.
197
The failure in Korea revealed the inability of the U.N. to enforce
military action.198 Member states other than the United States moved
slowly in providing military aid to the U.N. mission in Korea. 199 Thus,
the West, and particularly the United States, manipulated the Security
Council and the Assembly in the Korean action, 200 furthering the
U.S.'s agenda to protect their national interest from the spread of
communism. Although the General Assembly had "authorized" ac-
tion in Korea, the U.S.'s actions went beyond the requirements of en-
forcing the peace between North and South Korea and amounted to
"an attempted United Nations' conquest" and the enforcement of a
settlement upon an unwilling nation.20 ' President Truman claimed au-
thority under this Security Council "recommendation" to achieve the
objectives of the United States, which used its superiority in the U.N.
at the time to effectuate the Korean War.2° Thus, the Soviet Union's
absence and the threat of its veto did not prevent action under the
guise of the U.N.; it only prevented the conclusion of Article 43
agreements.
B. The Post-Cold War
Three significant military actions sponsored by the U.N. occurred
after the Cold War ended. The actions that took place during the Gulf
War and in Haiti exemplify the United States' willingness to become
involved when its interests are at stake. In contrast, the current con-
had nothing to do with major decisions, such as crossing the 38th parallel or refusing
forcible repatriation of prisoners. Id
195. White, supra note 88, at 86.
196. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (noting that if Article 43 agreements
are concluded, member nations are bound to act accordingly). But see Akehurst,
supra note 78, at 223 ("Article 43 provides a procedure by which the Security Council
may act, but it does not prevent the Security Council from choosing an alternative
procedure." (emphasis added)).
197. See United Nations Participation Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 264, §§ 1-7, 59 Stat.
619 (1949) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 287-287e (1988)).
198. Zeidan, supra note 6, at 8.
199. Id
200. White, supra note 88, at 87.
201. Id
202. See Glennon, supra note 133, at 19.
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ffict in Bosnia-Herzegovina exemplifies the limited, if any, U.S. in-
volvement in U.N. missions when U.S. interests are not at issue.20 a
1. The Persian Gulf War
During the forty years after the Korean involvement, the ideologi-
cal tensions of the Cold War preempted any effective use of collective
security under the U.N. Charter. In the late 1980's, however, the Cold
War began to thaw, and at the beginning of the next decade, Iraq in-
vaded Kuwait. This act triggered the Security Council to adopt
several noncombative measures to force Iraq to withdraw from
Kuwait.2
When Iraq refused to respond to these measures, the Security
Council adopted Resolution 678, "authorizing" the use of force. 0 5
This authorization occurred because most of the Security Council felt
that the economic sanctions already imposed against Iraq would be or
had demonstrated to be inadequate to force Iraq out of Kuwait.2o As
one scholar pointed out, Article 4220" did not appear to be the legal
foundation for the resolution even though Article 42 empowers the
Security Council to use military force if economic sanctions "would be
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate." 20  Article 42 was inop-
erative due to the article's dependent relationship with Article 43,
which calls for member states to "provide armed forces to effectuate
article 42. "20 9
203. Note that at the time of publication of this Note, the United States was in-
volved in air attacks in Bosnia. These attacks were launched by NATO, however, and
not the U.N. Furthermore, the NATO ground forces currently in Bosnia do not con-
tain U.S. troops. See Elaine Sciolino, NATO Raids Against Serbs Are Increased, N.Y.
Tunes, Sept. 8, 1995, at A14 ("Mr. Clinton and his aides are eager to limit the number
of American ground troops involved in enforcing a settlement in Bosnia.").
204. See William J. Durch, The Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission, in The Evolution
of UN Peacekeeping- Case Studies and Comparative Analysis 258, 259 (William J.
Durch ed., 1993). The Security Council acted gradually. First, the U.N. demanded
Iraq withdraw from Kuwait Id. The Security Council then imposed an embargo and
froze Iraqi and Kuwaiti international funds, "condemned and rejected Iraq's 'annexa-
tion' of Kuwait," and ordered Iraq to release the diplomats, consular officials, and
other foreign nationals who were hostages. Id. When Iraq did not respond, the Secur-
ity Council asked for navies to enforce its embargo, which eventually the U.N. ex-
tended to air traffic. Id. Finally, the Security Council authorized
Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on
or before 15 January 1991 fully implements ... the foregoing resolutions, to
use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and
all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and
security in the area.
Ld. (quoting S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. SfRes/678 (1991)).
205. See id.
206. Burns H1. Weston, Agora: The Gulf Crisis In International and Foreign Rela-
tions Law, Continued. Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision
Making: Precarious Legitimacy, 85 Am. J. Int'l L. 516, 519 (1991).
207. See supra note 85 and accompanying discussion.
208. Weston, supra note 206, at 519.
209. Id.; see also supra note 8.
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The members failed once again to implement Article 43 for two rea-
sons: (1) due to the Cold War, Article 42, and respectively Article 43,
had become a "dead letter," 10 and (2) the United States again pre-
empted the need for collective security action by taking unilateral
charge of the military enforcement under a U.N. guise.211 The United
States publicly declared four U.S. objectives for sending the massive
military forces into Kuwait: (1) the immediate and unconditional
withdrawal of all Iraqi troops from Kuwait; (2) the restoration of Ku-
wait's previous government; (3) security and stability of Saudi Arabia
and the Persian Gulf; and (4) the protection of American citizens
abroad.2 1 2 An unofficial, but publicly-recognized, reason for involve-
ment of U.S. troops was to protect the region's oil supply and prevent
any ramifications to the U.S. financial markets stemming from distur-
bances to that supply.2 13
Thus, just as in Korea, the Gulf War was a U.S. action2 14 under the
"fig leaf' of U.N. approval. Evidence of this can be found in the fact
that the Security Council never met between November 29, 1990, and
February 16, 1991, the period of the worst violence. 5
Thus, instead of creating special agreements, the Security Council
chose merely to say that it was "'[a]cting under Chapter VII of the
210. See Weston, supra note 206, at 519; David J. Scheffer, United Nations and In-
ternational Law Are Flying High, but Real Test Is to Come, L.A. Times, Sept. 2, 1990,
at M2, M2-M4.
211. As one congressman recognized, "We keep talking about the Persian Gulf as a
U.N. success, but it was really a U.S. success. Had it not been for the determination
of the United States to organize collective action under U.N. auspices, which was very
important, Iraq today would be in control of Kuwait and probably of Saudi Arabia."
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., Collective Security in the
Post-Cold War World 166 (May 3, 1993) (statement by Rep. Tom Lantos).
212. Scheffer, supra note 210, at M2.
213. See Kevin Phillips, Bush Faces Quagmire of Presidents Past: Part Vietnam, Part
Hostage, L.A. Times, Aug. 26, 1990, at M4. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait could have
affected U.S. economic interests in two ways: (1) the direct impact of oil price in-
creases; and (2) the indirect effect of the impact on inflation, interest rates, bond
prices, real estate, and the stock market. Il According to one source, higher oil
prices might have cost the United States $50 billion worth of growth in the next year
following the invasion. Id. ("For the international financial community to keep its
1980s speculative balls in the air, any renewal of inflation and commodity politics had
to be beaten down. Oil could not be allowed to rise again. Hussein [has] threatened
this balance....").
214. Regarding the national tension of the war powers balance: although the U.S.-
led coalition was "authorized" by the Security Council to take such measures, and
Bush was prepared to act without the approval of Congress, he did seek and receive
the formal backing by vote of the lawmakers. See Saul Friedman, Clinton's Tough Sell
For Invasion, Newsday, Sept. 12, 1994, at A4, A12; Charles Krauthammer, Clinton's
Little War, Wash. Post, Sept. 16, 1994, at A27. As already mentioned, the failure to
conclude special agreements led to the nonuse of the U.N.P.A. See supra note 197 and
accompanying text.
215. Will, supra note 192, at C7.
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Charter generally. ' 216 Article 51 of the Charter, affirming each na-
tion's right to individual or collective self-defense, formed the basis of
the U.N.'s, or more accurately the U.S.'s , response to Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait.217 Such an action was possible because "no explicit lan-
guage in Article 42 or in Articles 43, 44, and 45 ... preclude[d] states
from voluntarily making armed forces available to carry out the reso-
lutions of the Council adopted under [Chapter VII." 218 To prevent
the members of the Security Council at the time from using their veto
to block this "U.N." action, the United States promised incentives to
other member nations in exchange for their votes.219 Thus, regardless
of the Cold War's effect on the conclusion of Article 43 agreements,
such agreements were not called upon because the United States was
willing to shoulder the burden unilaterally?2-
2. Haiti
In 1991, a military junta, led by General Raoul Cedras and Police
Chief Lieutenant General Michel Francois, ousted Haitian president
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who fled to the United States accompanied by
an exodus of boat people.P 1 For the next three years, Cedras and
Francois fluctuated on promises to step down and reinstate Aris-
216. Weston, supra note 206, at 518-19 (quoting S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 4th
Sess., 2932d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1992)).
217. Will, supra note 192, at C7. But see Weston, supra note 206, at 518-20 (arguing
that neither Article 51 nor any part of Chapter VII forms a basis for the U.N. actions
in Kuwait).
218. Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 Am. 1. Int'l. L
452, 464 (1991).
219. The United States guaranteed long-sought financial aid to many Latin Ameri-
can and African delegations to ensure their votes. Weston, supra note 206, at 523.
The United States also sought to win Soviet support. News accounts reported that the
United States consented to help keep Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania out of the No-
vember 1990 Paris summit conference and also promised to convince Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia to give Moscow, which they did, the hard currency that Moscow re-
quired to pay outstanding bills to commercial creditors. Il at 524. To ensure that
China "voluntarily" abstained, versus threatening to veto, the United States ignored a
crackdown on political dissidents, agreed to lift trade sanctions existing since the
Tiananmen Square massacre of pro-democracy protesters, backed a $1143 million
loan from the World Bank to China, established a visit by the Chinese Foreign Minis-
ter to Washington, and resumed normal diplomatic exchange between the two coun-
tries. lId at 523-24. Finally, due to Yemen's opposition and negative vote, the United
States "rewarded" Yemen by cutting off American aid of $70 million annually. Id. at
524.
220. The U.N. Security Council abstained from
direct UN responsibility and accountability for the military force that ulti-
mately was deployed, favoring, instead, a delegated, essentially unilateralist
determination and orchestration of world policy, coordinated and controlled
almost exclusively by the United States.... As a consequence, it set a dubi-
ous precedent, both for the United Nations as it stands today and for the
"new world order" that is claimed for tomorrow.
Id. at 517.
221. Haiti's Troubled History, Wash. Post, Sept. 19, 1994, at A19.
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tide.222 The junta ignored democratic principles and engaged in
human rights abuses, which the U.N. condemned.223 Finally, in 1994,
the U.N. Security Council authorized the use of force to restore Adis-
tide, who was elected by an overwhelming majority in democratic
elections.224
The military action that the United States undertook in Haiti fur-
ther exemplified the U.S.'s history of protecting national interests
under the guise of a U.N. "mandate." The U.N. Security Council had
found a "threat" to the peace and mandated sanctions against the Hai-
tian dictators until Aristide was returned to power.225 Interestingly,
the Haitian regime did not pose a threat to international peace; how-
ever, many Haitian refugees did flee to the United States. 26
In regard to Haiti, yet again, the member states failed to conclude
special agreements with the Security Council pursuant to Article 43.
This time, however, the Cold War, which had ended four years prior,
was no excuse for this failure. Furthermore, the Haitian conflict oc-
curred after Secretary General Boutros-Ghali's call to revive Article
43 agreements. 2 7
Just as in Korea and the Gulf War, the U.N. resolution against the
military dictators in Haiti did not mandate that member states commit
troops. Such an action would not be possible without Article 43
agreements. Rather, the resolution only "authorized" the use of ac-
tion.228 In this case, the individual member nations had to decide
whether to act on their own.
The Clinton administration claimed that the Security Council "au-
thorized" the use of force in Haiti to protect "human rights."229 The
administration, however, could not seriously classify the Haitian inva-
222. During these three years, several nations united to impose embargoes on Ha-
iti. See id. Cedras and Francois signed an accord promising to step aside in favor of
Aristide but never heeded the accord. Id.
223. See Human Rights in Haiti, G.A. Res. 46/138, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/46/138 (1992); The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti,
G.A. Res. 47/20, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. AIRES/47/20 (1992).
224. Haiti's Troubled History, supra note 221, at A19. A brief history of the 1994
action in Haiti is as follows: the U.N. Security Council extended the embargo to a
blockade (May 6); United States stopped commercial flights between the United
States and Haiti (June 10); Haiti expelled U.N. human rights advisers (July 11); Jean-
Bertrand Aristide, Haiti's president, wrote the U.N. Secretary General, asking for
"swift and determined action" to restore democracy (July 29); and finally, the U.N.
Security Council unanimously authorized use of force in Haiti, with only Brazil and
China abstaining (July 31). Id.
225. Ruth Gordon, United Nations Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia,
and Beyond, 15 Mich. J. Int'l. L. 519, 573 (1994).
226. Id.
227. See Agenda for Peace, supra note 16, at 12-13.
228. S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940
(1994).
229. See Charles Krauthammer, Our Sphere, Their Sphere: The United States Has
Some Areas of Influence it Shouldn't Give Up, Wash. Post, Oct. 7, 1994, at A25 ("Pres-
ident Clinton points to Security Council Resolution 940 and a paper coalition of
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sion as a true U.N. police action because the United States asked the
Security Council for its "blessing" to resolve a situation that was, in
fact, a thinly disguised attempt to protect U.S. national interests.23°
The U.S. interest at stake was the fall of a democracy in the U.S.
sphere of influence: "The whole justification of the Haiti operation is
that this is trouble 'in our backyard.' What does 'our backyard' mean,
if not 'our sphere of influence?"''
Once again, in the Haitian action, the Security Council did not
"need" Article 43 special agreements, because one country was acting
unilaterally. The failure to implement Article 43 agreements was due
to the Clinton administration's ability to push the resolution through
the Security Council with promises of U.S. enforcement, 2- thus pre-
empting the need for the Security Council to make formal agree-
ments. The U.S. intervention was approved due to deal making
among the Security Council members. In this case, Russia threatened
to veto U.N. approval of a Haiti invasion if anyone refused to endorse
Russian freedom of action in its former colony.233 The U.N., there-
fore, quietly approved Russian "peacekeeping" troops in formerly So-
viet Georgia.34 Thus, in Haiti, the "veto" threat, which prevented
special agreements from being concluded during the Cold War, still
existed. Russia, however, had learned its lesson from the Korean War;
rather than allowing their absenteeism to facilitate the passage of Se-
curity Council resolutions, it used its veto as a tool to secure U.N.
"approval" for actions in their own sphere of influence.
The U.S. domestic tension over the constitutional balance of war
powers appeared in the Haitian crisis just as it did in the U.N.-author-
ized actions in Korean and Kuwait. The Clinton administration be-
lieved that congressional approval was not required for the Haiti
invasion.235 Some administration officials told members of Congress
that under the Charter and the U.N.P.A.,2 6 the President does not
need congressional approval to partake in actions authorized or re-
quired by the Security Council.237 One administration official even
[twenty-eight] countries as proof that Haiti is a U.N. police action, not an old-style
assertion of the U.S. sphere.").
230. See id; see also Gordon, supra note 225, at 574 (noting that Haiti was an
"attempt to assist regional efforts" (emphasis added)).
231. Krauthammer, supra note 229, at A25.
232. See supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
233. Lally Weymouth, Yalta II, Wash. Post, July 24, 1994, at C7 ("[A]t least one UN
diplomat compares [this compromise] with the controversial 1945 'spheres of influ-
ence' Yalta pact.").
234. Il As one commentator noted, however, Russia's "role is less to keep peace
than to restore a small piece of the old Soviet empire and signal Russia's intent to
reestablish hegemony over the rest." Charles Krauthammer, Goodby Monroe Doc-
trine, Wash. Post, Aug. 2, 1994, at A15.
235. Friedman, supra note 214, at A4.
236. Note that once again, because Article 43 agreements were not made in the
international arena, the U.N.P.A. was not triggered on the domestic front.
237. See Friedman, supra note 215, at A12.
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told Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole that "'the UN Charter...
was never a means of eliminating the constitutional role' of the Con-
gress."" 8 After the loss of twenty-six U.S. troops in the U.N. Somalia
operation, however, Clinton promised fuller consultation with Con-
gress.2 39 Ironically, as Arkansas governor, Clinton had pressed Presi-
dent Bush to seek congressional approval for the Gulf War. 40
Although Bush was ready to use military force in Kuwait without
Congress' approval, he did ask for and receive Congress' formal back-
ing by vote for the Desert Storm mission.24'
3. Bosnia-Herzegovina
The former Yugoslavia has dissolved into an area fraught with eth-
nic tension, civil war, and disregard for international authority. 2 A The
Bosnian conflict revolves around ethnic clashes among Bosnian Serbs,
Croats, and Muslims. The Serbs have engaged in a program of "ethnic
cleansing" to rid themselves of Muslims. This has lead to appalling
human rights abuses, including rape camps, concentration camps, and
large bombardments of civilian targets.
The U.N. initially attempted to stop the human rights abuses by
sending peace-keeping troops to the Balkans. As Serbian aggression
continued and escalated, the Security Council tried to contain the hos-
tilities through several measures.' The Bosnian Serbs, however, re-
jected every U.N. demand.24
Recently, France, Britain, and the Netherlands planned to contrib-
ute a rapid reaction force to protect U.N. peacekeepers in Bosnia. 6
The Security Council, however, has not recommended that Article 43
govern these forces, which are intended to do no more than protect
238. Id. (quoting Louis Fisher, senior specialist on presidential powers for the Con-
gressional Research Service, an arm of the Library of Congress). About 140 members
of Congress in both parties urged Clinton to seek congressional approval for the Haiti
operation, even though he never did. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at A12.
242. See, e.g., Robert Kagan, Truce? Expect a Wider War, N.Y. Tmes, Dec. 20,
1994, at A23 (noting that U.N. peacekeepers have been harassed); Morganthau et al.,
supra note 17, at 19 ("The Serbs have been devious and defiant in Bosnia, calculating
correctly that the Western Alliance is all talk and no action.").
243. Gordon, supra note 225, at 571.
244. See Morgenthau et al., supra note 17, at 19. In May 1992, the U.N. Security
Council demanded the Serbian army to withdraw from Bosnia; the army simply
united with local Serb nationalists. Id. The U.N. did not respond. fit In August 1992,
Western nations ordered that Serbs relinquish their weapons to the U.N. and stop the
siege of Sarajevo. Id. The Serbian president said he had no control of the Bosnian
Serbs; the West again did not respond. ld. In March 1993, the U.N. Security Council
passed a resolution to enforce a no-fly zone over Bosnia; the Serbs violated the ban
almost 800 times. Id. The West never attempted to enforce the ban. Id.
245. Id. at 17-18.
246. Roger Cohen, Balkan Force to Fight Back if Threatened, N.Y. Tunes, July 7,
1995, at A10.
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the U.N. peacekeepers who are under a mandate to deliver food and
other aid to U.N. safe areas.' 7 The proposal to create this rapid reac-
tion force is seen as a test of Europe's ability to handle problems of
aggression within its sphere of influence without U.S. military aid.2 43
While President Clinton initially was willing to aid the operation fi-
nancially, Congress has refused to approve the funds 49
Some argue that the atrocities, and the length and the intensity of
the conflict, in Bosnia are as bad, if not worse, than those committed
in Haiti. °5 0 Because Bosnia is not an area within the U.S.'s sphere of
influence, however, President Clinton has refused to contribute U.S.
forces to a permanent standby force in accordance with Article 43 spe-
cial agreements.25' Such a U.S. stance would translate into a veto of
Article 43 special agreements, if another member nation were to pro-
pose concluding such agreements? -  The Security Council, however,
has learned from history and has not proposed to make Article 43
agreements for a standby force to combat aggression beyond the calls
for peace-keeping units. Thus, because the United States has neither
backed nor become involved in a U.N. military action, the U.N. has
been unable to effectively control the tragedy occurring in Bosnia.253
IV. THE POLITICAL REALITY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN CONFLICT WITH
LEGAL IDEALISM
The forces used in the military actions which the U.N. authorized in
Korea, Kuwait, Haiti, and Bosnia were not provided by Article 43, the
mechanism to provide troops for collective international action
against violators of international law.35 The drafters in San Francisco
247. See id.; see also S.C. Res. 871, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3286th mtg. at 9, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/871 (1993) (acting under Chapter VII and authorizing the United Na-
tions Protection Force to take necessary measures "including the use of force" but not
mentioning Article 43).
248. Id
249. Military Moves in Bosnia, N.Y. Times, June 17, 1995, § 1, at 18.
250. See Gordon, supra note 225, at 573 (noting that the human rights abuses in
Haiti were not the focus of the U.N. resolution finding a "threat" to the peace and not
on the level of those committed in Somalia, where the intensity of the abuses is analo-
gous to those committed in Bosnia).
251. See Jim Hoagland, A Breakthrough for Clinton Too, Wash. Post, Sept. 14, 1993,
at A21. President Clinton does not see Bosnia as an area where the United States can
have a conclusive impact. Ld. He believes that the United States should only get in-
volved where the United States has an opportunity to solve the problem. Id.
252. See, e.g., Roger Cohen, The World. Withdrawal Symptoms; Honor, Too, Is Put
to Flight in Bosnia, N.Y. Tmes, July 16, 1995, § 4, at 1 (noting that "American
commitment to European security" has died or been seriously compromised); Kagan,
supra note 242, at A23 (stating that the United States has an "irresolute Balkan pol-
icy" and "[tiwo Administrations have declared the crisis beyond [the U.S.'s]
responsibility").
253. See Walter Hoffmann, Mr. Boutros-Ghali's Plan, Wash. Post, Aug. 19, 1993, at
A28 (quoting former undersecretary general Brian Urquhart).
254. See supra part I.C (discussing collective security under Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter).
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had envisioned that the U.N. Security Council ideally would employ
this legal measure so that its members would act jointly when interna-
tional peace proved elusive by other means.
The Cold War, however, prevented unified action between the
member states in the Security Council.2 55 The superpowers used the
veto in the Security Council as a sword, slashing at any action that
would undermine or interfere with their national interests." 6 Once
the Cold War ended, the world had renewed hopes of finally using the
Charter mechanisms that provide for cohesive international action to
create a truly global environment free of spheres of influence.257 The
reality, however, is that after years of hard work and sacrifice to gain
hegemony, the United States controls several spheres of influence that
many think it should not readily relinquish.258 Both the United States
and other member states have used the veto and the guise of a "U.N.
peace-keeping" action as a shield to hide behind, while maintaining
control over its spheres of influence.
This part rationalizes the historical trend depicted in part III with a
legal analysis of the Charter and policy analysis of "sovereign nations"
by examining the two common reasons behind the Security Council's
failure to make Article 43 special agreements in the Cold War period
and post-Cold War periods. These common factors are political reali-
ties-the desire to maintain spheres of influence and sovereign iden-
tity-and the legal mechanism of the U.N. veto, which nations have
used as a sword during the Cold War and as a shield today. Both of
these factors have precluded unified collective action under Article 43
throughout its history, and unless the U.N. takes some corrective ac-
tion, any use of Article 43 remains dim. This part concludes with a
proposal that would remove the obstacle created by the collision of
these factors through the adoption of a qualified majority vote, such
as the one that the European Community has implemented which
would more easily allow collective action under Article 43.
A. The Legal Idealism: 9 The Veto and Special Agreements
The Charter states in Article 2 that the system "is based on the prin-
ciple of the sovereign equality of all its Members."26 This principle is
codified in Article 18 by the rule that "[e]ach member of the General
255. See supra part III.A (discussing the U.N. action in Korea).
256. See supra part III.A.
257. U.N. ambassador Madeleine Albright told a Moscow audience, "Let us all
work for the day when we will see a Europe fully liberated from spheres of influence
and artificial division." Krauthammer, supra note 229, at A25.
258. Id. The U.S.'s spheres of influence include the following: Western Europe,
the core Middle East (Egypt, Israel, and the gulf states), and much of the Pacific Rim.
The United States' most prominent sphere of influence is in the Western Hemisphere,
as evidenced by the current occupation of Haiti. Id.
259. See supra note 29.
260. U.N. Charter art. 2, 1.
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Assembly shall have one vote"'" and by Article 27's rule that "[e]ach
member of the Security Council shall have one vote."'  Article 27
adds the proviso, however, that most substantive decisions of the Se-
curity Council require not only the support of a majority of nine mem-
bers, but "the concurring votes of the permanent members."' This
"veto" seems to undermine the coherence of the general principle of
"sovereign equality" established in Article 2. The Charter appears to
deprive the nonveto-endowed states of equality, a deprivation that
these states have considered demeaning in the past and even more so
today2 64
The Big Five256 agreed on two compromises at the Charter drafting.
First, they would use their veto only in situations having the most con-
sequential impact on their basic interest.266 Second, if one of the
Council members were a party in a dispute, that member would ab-
stain from voting.' 7 At the time, these compromises seemed signifi-
cant enough to convince the hesitant majority that the veto, although
inconsistent with state equality, still maintained coherence and legiti-
macy within the Charter.216 Unfortunately, changes in the global sys-
tem and in the way the veto has been used in practice no longer justify
the idealistic legal mechanisms proposed by the Charter drafters.
In 1945 and during the Cold War, the Big Five were the world's
major powers,2 69 and as the victors of the Second World War, had a
special authority in world affairs.270 In today's post-Cold War era,
however, Britain, France, and China are no longer "super" powers
261. I& art. 18, 1 1.
262. Id. art. 27, 1.
263. Id. art 27, 3.
264. Franck, supra note 1, at 176. Even in 1945, at the drafting of the Charter, the
smaller nations, a majority at the time, opposed this distinguished treatment. Back
then, however, the Big Five paid most of the organization's costs and were expected
to assume most of the military and financial obligations for fulfilling the Charter's
mandate. Id 'Thus, logically they should have had a greater say in key decisions.
More importantly, "since the fledgling organization could not expect to compel any of
the 'Big Five' to act against its will, the veto merely acknowledged an obvious reality."
ld. (emphasis added).
265. The "Big Five" refers to the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council
Britain, France, China, the Soviet Union (now Russia), and the United States. See
supra note 3.
266. Franck, supra note 1, at 177.
267. ld.; see also U.N. Charter art. 27, 3.
268. Franck, supra note 1, at 177. Franck defines legitimacy as "an independent
variable, one which controls the extent to which a rule is perceived to exert a power-
ful pull toward compliance on those to whom it is addressed." I& at 25.
269. "Major powers" refers to countries possessing (1) military strength-those
countries who displayed military prowess through the victory over the Axis powers in
World War II and thus, became the postwar leaders and (2) economic strength. lI& at
177.
270. I&
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and are economically inferior to resurgent Germany and Japan.2 71
Thus, the once rational justification for Big Five privileges has lost its
plausibility.
Moreover, the permanent members have not used the veto spar-
ingly. 72 "Great Power unanimity collapsed almost immediately" with
the Iranian crisis during the first few days of the Council's agenda in
January of 1946.273 During the Cold War, both the Soviet Union274
and the United States wielded their vetoes in the Security Council to
prevent U.N. interference in their spheres of influence.275 Thus, the
geopolitical division of the world into competing power blocs severely
limited the areas in which the Security Council could properly carry
out its function of maintaining international peace and security.2 76
The permanent members also have not practiced self-restraint in
abstaining when one is a "party to a dispute" as originally promised. 77
For example, in 1986 the United States did not abstain from vetoing a
U.N. resolution requesting the United States to carry out the judg-
ment against it by the World Court in a dispute with Nicaragua. 278
Thus, the permanent U.N. members have not upheld the promises
that their representatives made at San Francisco. Consequently, the
veto has slowly but surely undermined the coherence and legitimacy
of the Charter.279
271. Id. India, Brazil, and Nigeria now probably can claim a preferred status equal
to Britain and France's based on geographic and demographic grounds, if not on a
purely economic or military basis. Il
272. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
273. White, supra note 88, at 15.
274. The Soviet Union's Security Council member, Foreign Minister Andrei A.
Gromyko, was nicknamed "Mr. Nyet" because of the many vetoes he cast in the Se-
curity Council over a short period of time. See Baehr & Gordenker, supra note 62, at
150.
275. Gary Younge, Everybody's Talking About... Peacekeeping, The Guardian,
Nov. 25, 1994, at T3; White, supra note 88, at 5 ("Collective security was subservient
to the national interests of the Great Powers, particularly the superpowers, who pro-
tected those interests by the power of veto."). Because the United States and the
U.S.S.R. had most of the world divided between them, U.N. peacekeeping was mini-
mal-amounting to no more than overseeing stalemates in such areas as Cyprus and
Kashmir. Younge, supra at T3. Note however that while Korea was considered to be
in the U.S.S.R.'s sphere, the U.S.S.R. was absent from the Security Council, thereby
allowing the United States to assert its national interest in combating communism
throughout the world. See supra part III.A (discussing the U.N. action in Korea).
276. See Younge, supra note 275, at T3.
277. Franck, supra note 1, at 177-78.
278. Id. at 178; see also Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
279. See Franck, supra note 1, at 178. While the Charter has not been amended,
Britain, China, and France, with a few exceptions, have vetoed actions only when
accompanied by a majority of the Council, the United States, or the U.S.S.R. Thus,
effectively, these three permanent Security Council members "have voluntarily con-
tributed to the de facto remission of their veto power." Id.
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The U.N.'s weakness "as a charter-enforcing organization is incur-
able because of the Security Council veto."' Ironically, however, the
U.N. would be nonexistent without the veto.281 Yet, the veto also sig-
nifies that the U.N. can never replace individual or collective self-de-
fense 2 Inevitably, the Charter leaves its members with two grim
choices: "chaos" or "great-power unanimity," which is a rarity at
best.a2
3
B. The Political Reality: Sovereignty and National Interests
The permanent members of the Security Council can wield the legal
weapon of the veto to enforce their policy goals as sovereign nations
desiring to protect their national interests. For the United States, this
desire has taken two forms: internationalism s4 as recognized during
the Cold War, and isolationism,28s as evidenced by Bosnia and the
aftermath in Somalia.' s Although the United States pledged to up-
hold the U.N.'s ideal of maintaining global peace and security, it his-
torically has conducted its foreign policy, including the commitment of
forces for combat as per Article 43, based solely on its needs and not
those of nations in distress.28 This historical tension was illustrated
most recently by President Clinton, who stated in the same address
that although the United States must be "the world's leader," it must
not be "the world's policeman."'
280. Eugene V. Rostow, The Balkans-A Place To Stop Aggression, Wash. Post,
June 30, 1993, at A21.
281. See id.; supra part I.D (commenting on the need for the veto to ensure the
membership of the five permanent members).
282. Rostow, supra note 280, at A21.
283. Id.
284. See infra note 290 (defining internationalism).
285. See infra note 295 (defining isolationism).
286. The U.N. action in Somalia, where non-Americans headed U.S. forces, has led
to a reluctance within the Clinton administration to commit forces to foreign conflicts.
The administration has not forgotten that eighteen American servicemen were killed
in the streets of Mogadishu in October 1993. Julia Preston, U.S. Troops May Aid in
U.N. Withdrawal from Somalia, Wash. Post, Sept. 16, 1994, at A29. These deaths
forced the Clinton administration to immediately withdraw U.S. troops from Somalia.
Id. The Somalia disaster "illustrates the unacceptable danger to U.S. military person-
nel of serving with multinational units with different equipment and levels of exper-
tise, under U.N. tested command structures." See 140 Cong. Rec. S177-03, S181 (daily
ed. Jan. 26, 1994) [hereinafter UN Peacekeeping] (statement of Sen. Dole) (discussion
on a bill to amend the U.N.P.A.).
287. Rostow, supra note 280, at A21 ("This view of the national interest has been
the basic theme of American foreign policy since the time of President Truman, and it
is so still.").
288. Elaine Sciolino, The Reluctant Policeman Is Still Picky About His Beat, N.Y.
Tmes, Oct. 16, 1994, at E4.
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1. Internationalism and National Interests
The United States displayed fervent internationalism2 8 9 during the
Cold War due to the perception of an immediate Soviet danger to U.S.
security.290 The Cold War gave the appearance that traditional U.S.
isolationism had completely died.29' Many believed that Americans
finally had made the great transition and would forever after accept
the global responsibilities that accompany global power.292 To a large
extent, this was true; the United States has played, and will continue
to play, a role of world leadership. It has accepted international eco-
nomic, political, and military obligations to an extent unprecedented
in American history.
Thus, it is in this "global" mode that U.S. presidents have acted
under the guise of a U.N. "authorization" for "peacekeeping" pur-
poses to actualize American agendas overseas, as evidenced in the re-
cent exploits in Kuwait and Haiti. These one-sided actions are
limited, however, as "[i]ntervention in Haiti and Iraq, however suc-
cessful, is the exception, not the rule."2 93 The success of the Haiti
intervention was made possible only by the abstention from the use of
the veto, most notably by Russia. 94 The possibility that one of the
permanent members still may use its veto probably will prevent the
conclusion of Article 43 agreements. Rather than risk embarrass-
ment, losing time in getting a military action assembled, and losing
national impetus and backing, a nation would rather employ its own
forces, under its own command, with a U.N.-backed authorization to
accomplish its agenda.
2. Isolationism2 95 and National Interests
At the same time, protecting national interests also can take an
"isolationist" mode; that is, not sending "our boys" into areas that are
not vital American interests, even though the U.N. may "call" for ac-
tion.296 U.S. citizens greatly detest the "acid test" of collective secur-
ity-sending U.S. troops on peacemaking missions not involving vital
U.S. interests.2 97 The public and congressional clamor resulting from
289. For purposes of this Note, "internationalism" refers to a nation's involvement
in world affairs by accepting international economic, political, and military responsi-
bilities. See Schlesinger, supra note 149, at 7.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Sciolino, supra note 288, at E4.
294. See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text (noting that Russia backed
down from using its veto when it benefited from a deal with the U.N.).
295. For purposes of this Note, "isolationism" refers to a nation's unwillingness to
become involved in the affairs of other nations, whether economically, militarily, or
politically. Cf. supra note 289 (defining "internationalism").
296. See infra part IV.C.
297. Schlesinger, supra note 149, at 7.
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the death of U.S. troops in distant areas not only prevents U.S. ground
force activity in peacemaking missions but also makes any participa-
tion in peacekeeping difficult.298
When faced with these sentiments, the U.S. representative to the
U.N. has never agreed, and will not agree, to committing U.S. troops
to a military contingent under Article 4339 Because the U.N. is not a
sovereign body, nothing forces the United States to conclude Article
43 agreements. As one legal scholar stated, however, "[D]ream must
encounter reality. ''300 The prevention and punishment of aggression
require military enforcement. Thus, sending in troops for any interna-
tional effort is a "dream," as exemplified by the U.N.-backed actions
in Bosnia and Somalia, while the reality is that the United States will
use only U.S. troops for military enforcement in its own sphere of
influence.30 1 Although "loose constructionists" of the Charter believe
the existence of such problems justifies expanding U.N. jurisdictions
to deal with these problematic areas, such a concerted action under
the U.N. umbrella, for example under Article 43 agreements, will not
happen if a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council can ef-
fectively block action with a veto.302 As Jeane Kirkpatrick stated,
"We are slipping into practices which enhance only the power of the
strongest.' 303
298. l
299. See George W. Ball, Personal Perspectives on the Day the War Began January
16, 1991, L.A. Times, Jan. 20, 1991, at M1, M8 (concluding that Article 43 agreements
are basically a lost cause and that the world will have to be satisfied with a large
nation flying the U.N. flag, possibly accompanied by smaller nations, as peace-keep-
ing forces ("As long as the world remains fragmented into nation-states, there will be
conflicts, and it will be hard to raise substantial bodies of troops to fight for an ab-
straction without the galvanizing inducement of national loyalty.")).
300. Schlesinger, supra note 149, at 5.
301. Id The military action in Bosnia exemplifies U.S. reluctance to act outside of
its sphere of influence:
The tragedy of Bosnia has confronted all democracies with a drastic ques-
tion: how can a government, whose political position may already be preca-
rious for domestic reasons, explain to its people why their husbands, fathers,
brothers or sons should die in battle in remote lands where the local out-
come makes no difference to the homeland?
Id at 5-6; see also note 286 (noting that especially after Somalia, the United States is
reluctant to commit American troops to an internationally-commanded force, as
would be required under Article 43 special agreements).
302. See Jeane Kirkpatrick, When Should the Tanks Roll?, Wash. Post, Oct. 17,
1994, at A19.
303. Id Jeane Kirkpatrick further commented:
If international force is necessary to stop human rights abuses in Haiti then,
[the loose constructionists] say, use it. But what about human rights abuses
in China? Use of force there is unthinkable. China would block action with
its veto and, if necessary, with military force. But expansion of international
force and jurisdiction into the internal affairs of states applies to major pow-
ers; to Russia, not to the associated nations of the Commonwealth of In-
dependent States; to the United States, not to Haiti; to the developed states,
not the undeveloped.
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C. The Legal Future
Recently proposed legislation in the United States would curb U.S.
military activity in the U.N., further reducing what remains of the
U.N.'s effectiveness in controlling aggression through nonforce meas-
ures. Other member nations have also begun to focus more on their
internal affairs and less on those of the U.N., which struggles to han-
dle the current international problems. The result of this trend to-
wards isolationism is that the future of using Article 43 agreements
remains dim.
1. The National Arena
Senators from both parties recently endorsed a Peace Powers Act
that would amend the U.N.P.A. to provide a statutory congressional
role in the relationship between the United States and the U.N.3°
The bill requires congressional consultation fifteen days before any
Security Council vote on peacekeeping. The purpose of the bill is to
"restore the primacy of U.S. national interests by placing limits on our
involvement in U.N. peace operations abroad. '30 5
Ironically, the President also has introduced a new proposition, the
Presidential Decision Directive 25, which states that "[t]he United
States does not support a standing U.N. army, nor will we earmark
specific U.S. military units for participation in U.N. operations. 30 6
The directive sets forth a series of new and restrictive criteria for U.S.
participation in collective security operations. 7 Thus, Presidential
Decision Directive 25 reflects growing disenchantment with the Wil-
sonian dream308 even at the executive level.
This directive, however, still does not satisfy the neo-isolationists.
The Speaker of the House of Representatives, Newt Gingrich, called
it "a profound mistake" and reproached the President for still rever-
ing the "multinational fantasy." The directive, according to Gingrich,
"continues to subordinate the United States to the United Na-
tions. ' 30 9 Under the new Republican leadership, headed by Congress-
man Gingrich himself, Congress will most likely head in the
isolationist direction with respect to collective security-the opposite
position from the ideal toward which the U.N. drafters aimed."
304. See UN Peacekeeping, supra note 286, at S181 ("[T]his Act would not limit
presidential power to act under Article 43 o[r] article 51 of the U.N. Charter in de-
fense of American interests-in Somalia, in Bosnia, in Haiti or anywhere else-unless
the President chooses to involve U.S. forces in a U.N. peacekeeping operation.").
305. Schlesinger, supra note 149, at 7.
306. Id. at 5.
307. Id.
308. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (defining the Wilsonian dream).
309. Schlesinger, supra note 149, at 7.
310. In the congressional leadership, Speaker Gingrich will be joined by another
Republican leader, Jesse Helms, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee. Before succeeding to his new post, Senator Helms had already denounced
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In early 1995, the House approved the National Security Revitaliza-
tion Act,31' which would cut U.S. funding of U.N. peace-keeping ac-
tions and give Congress stronger control over U.S. troop participation
in U.N. actions. 12 The Republicans, who sponsored the bill, feel that
"[i]t is high time that we rein in U.N. peacekeeping, which is out of
control."31 3 The sponsors' main concern is to control the increasing
demands of the U.N. on American forces and money.314 To ensure
that the executive would not commit American troops to U.N. actions
which Congress did not approve, Congress would require the presi-
dent to base his decision on a national security need.? 5 Critics who
decry the bill argue that it would cripple U.N. peace-keeping efforts,
such as the mission in Haiti. 16
In conclusion, the current Clinton administration bluntly stated that
whether the United States will enter into Article 43 agreements at the
call of the Security Council "is of course a policy, rather than a legal,
question. As Secretary Christopher stated, '[W]e do not exclude the
possibility of an Article 43 type of force down the road but at this
point it seems quite remote."''3 17 The result of both the Presidential
Decision Directive and the National Security Revitalization Act will
be further restrictions on U.S. action within the U.N. Such a result is
consistent with the wishes of the American populace, which fear a
"loss of U.S. sovereignty to the U.N. '318 Without U.S. backing, how-
ever, the U.N. will be able to conduct little more than peace-keeping
missions,1 9 far from the military action the framers envisioned.
foreign aid and the U.N. Richard Cohen, Chairman Jesse, Wash. Post, Nov. 22, 1994,
at A21.
311. Eric Schmitt, House Votes Bill to Cut U.N. Funds for Peacekeeping, N.Y.
Tunes, Feb. 17, 1995, at Al, A9.
312. Id. at Al.
313. Id. (statement of Republican Majority Leader, Senator Robert Dole).
314. Id. at A9 ("The nation has gone too far in the direction of globalism and lost
sight of its essential footings, and we intend to correct that." (statement of House
Majority Leader, Rep. Dick Armey)).
315. Id.
316. See id, (noting that this bill would cut the U.S.'s expenditures for U.N.
peacekeeping from 31.7 percent to 20 percent).
317. United States: Department Of State Statement On The Legal Authority For UN
Peace Operations, 33 Int'l Legal Materials 821, 828-29 (1994) (statement of Conrad K.
Harper, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, before the U.S. House Govern-
ment Operations Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security on Mar. 3,
1994).
318. Crossette, supra note 2, at 6 (quoting Rep. Lee H1 Hamilton).
319. See John Walker, UN Standby Force a Worthy Proposal, Edmonton Journal,
Oct. 9, 1994, at C8 available in WESTLAW, 1994 WL 8519558 ("The Americans are
going to be one of the big questions in [devising a plan to provide for U.N. standby
forces, permanently committed to the U.N.], since they absolutely refuse to work
under UN command, and have to date shown little talent for the less warlike aspects
of peacekeeping or peace enforcement."); see also, Glennon, supra note 133, at 19
("Few Americans are likely to take comfort knowing that Finland, Zaire, and Colom-
bia have approved risking tens of thousands of American casualties.").
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2. The International Arena
Other countries have recognized the self-serving actions of the
United States in the international sphere. Some believe that with the
Cold War over, the Council should use Article 43 to develop the
standby peace-enforcement troops envisioned in the Charter, arguing
that after the Persian Gulf war, "it is no longer acceptable that inter-
national action is taken only when a situation threatens the interests
of the most powerful nations. 3 20 In light of recent Security Council
activity in "the zones of influence of the... superpowers, it is still true
to say that their interests represent a vast limitation on the Council's
operative area."3 2
1
The United States is not the only Big Five power capable of using
the veto to protect its interest. As previously mentioned, Russia re-
cently has threatened to veto actions to protect its area of hegem-
ony.322 Even China, which has used the veto sparingly in the past,
currently views as its main concern sovereignty and protection of its
freedom to act without U.N. intervention.323 Thus, as before, the per-
manent members' "interests and influences have become so pervasive
in the post-war world that the veto has effectively debarred the Secur-
ity Council from taking action or recommending measures of any sort
in many areas of the globe. '324
The end of the Cold War was supposed to free the U.N. to do what
its founders intended in keeping the peace through collective security.
Unfortunately, this has not occurred. Despite his attempts to revital-
ize the U.N. peace-keeping efforts and the use of Article 43 special
agreements 325 after the Cold War,326 the Secretary General has real-
ized reluctantly that such efforts327 are not consistent with the political
reality of sovereign nations. The Secretary General now seems to be
320. Paul Lewis, Leaders Want to Enhance U.N.'s Role, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1992,
at A8 (quoting Sir Brian Urquhart, a former Under Secretary General in charge of
peacekeeping).
321. White, supra note 88, at 14.
322. See infra part III.B.2 (discussing Russia's threat to veto U.S. operations in Ha-
iti if the other member states denied a Russian free hand in certain of their former
colonies).
323. How to Contain Iraq, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1994, at A18.
324. White, supra note 88, at 9.
325. See Agenda for Peace, supra note 16, 42-44.
326. See Barbara Crossette, U.N. Chief Ponders Future of Peacekeepers, N.Y.
Tunes, Mar. 3, 1995, at A3 ("Today, on the day the last United Nations peacekeeping
troops left Somalia, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali suggested that the
hopes for a new international order that blossomed at the end of the cold war has
evaporated.").
327. Id. ("I thought Boutros-Ghali's comments were very much in line with a new
realistic approach to peacekeeping based on what has happened since that ebullient
moment two years ago when he put forth his Agenda for Peace and everything
seemed possible.... We now realize how difficult certain peacekeeping operations are
and that they should be restricted in scope." (statement of Rita Hauser, an interna-
tional lawyer and former U.S. representative to the U.N.)).
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redirecting his expectations more realistically; he anticipates "the
need to 'contract out' more operations to regional organizations or
multinational forces led by major powers with special interests in the
disputes-like the... United States forces in Haiti."a
Every nation, preoccupied with its own domestic troubles, is in-
clined to dump international problems on the U.N. 9 Unfortunately,
the U.N. cannot handle those problems due to a stifling bureaucracy
and a lack of resources, power, personnel, funds, training, and equip-
ment.330 Moreover, the U.N. does not have the framework and coer-
cive ability331  to demand collective security through the
implementation of Article 43 agreements. Fifty years ago, the U.N.
framers envisioned an international organization that had military
strength to combat aggression through standing forces provided by
Article 43. Unfortunately, the reality is that the U.N. has become an
entity capable of only peace-keeping missions and a messenger of "ad-
monitions or demands with little or no impact. '3 32
D. A Proposed Amendment to the U.N. Charter
The European Community333 ("Community") is probably the only
international organization operating under a multilateral agreement
whereby the member nations have transferred some portion of their
sovereign jurisdiction to an overriding governmental body.334 The
Community twice has made major modifications to its empowering
328. Id. This possibility has aroused much trepidation that "old spheres of influ-
ence are being reasserted in a new guise." Itt
329. Schlesinger, supra note 149, at 7.
330. Id.
331. The U.N. Secretary General has maintained that under the present U.N. Char-
ter provisions, he is extremely limited in his peace-keeping abilities. To amend the
Charter's operational mandates allowing the use of force would "now mean 'that no-
body would send troops."' See Crossette, supra note 326, at A3 (quoting Secretary
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali).
332. Hoffmann, supra note 253, at A28 (quoting Brian Urquhart); se4 e.g., Stanley
Meisler, 50 Years Ago, Hopes Soared as U.N. Began Life, LA. Tunes, June 26, 1995,
at Al ("The almost naive enthusiasm with which Americans regarded the United Na-
tions in 1945 has given way to a more skeptical-some would call it merely realistic-
view of what the world body can accomplish."); Walker, supra note 319, at C8 ("A
recent UN task Force [sic] could not come up with any new way to expand the use of
UN forces, because its members could not widen their view beyond the peacekeeping
roles now established.").
333. The European Community is an organization of European nations that sup-
ports a common economic market free of trade barriers. The Community has four
political organs: the Council of Ministers, the decision-making branch; the Commis-
sion, the executive organ; the European Parliament, the representative, advisory
body; and the Court of Justice, the Community's main judicial arm. See George A.
Bermann et al., Cases and Materials on European Community Law 50-73 (1993).
334. See Matthias J. Herdegen, The "Constitudionalization" of the UN Security Sys-
tem, 27 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 135, 150-52 (1994).
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treaty.335 The most important effect of the Single European Act was
the elimination of the unanimity requirement in many significant ar-
eas of legislation.336 With the removal of unanimity and the substitu-
tion of qualified majority voting,337 the Community was able to
overcome the previous blockage of legislation that it had faced. 338
A modification of the voting scheme similar to that in the Commu-
nity's Treaty could be made to the U.N. Charter. Eliminating the veto
only for concluding Article 43 agreements would still allow the perma-
nent members of the Security Council to retain this power in all other
areas. Restricting the elimination of the veto only to Article 43 agree-
ments, for the purpose of finally fulfilling the U.N.'s goal to maintain
peace, may lead to acceptance of this proposal because it only affects
one article. If the elimination of the veto in this manner is successful,
then the U.N. may wish to expand the elimination to other areas
through subsequent modifications to the Charter, as occurred in the
Community.339
To safeguard abuse by the permanent members and ensure geo-
graphical and ideological balance, a two-step process should be imple-
mented. First, the Security Council should take a preliminary vote to
consider whether special agreements should be made at all. Second, if
this process results in a majority, the issue then should be transferred
to the General Assembly in which each nation would have a vote.3A0
This second phase would involve a qualified majority3' vote based on
troop contributions. Such a formula would safeguard the permanent
335. The first transition was from the original European Economic Community
Treaty to the Single European Act ("SEA"). See Bermann, supra note 333, at 14-15.
The second transition was from the SEA to the Maastricht Treaty which now governs
the European Union ("EU"). See id at 16-19.
336. See Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to
the European Council, COM(85)310 final at 1 13, reprinted in Bermann, supra note
333, at 434-35 [hereinafter Completing the Internal Market] (stating that "action
under this Article would be... more effective if the Council were to agree not to
allow the unanimity requirement to obstruct progress where it could otherwise be
made").
337. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community [EEC Treaty] art.
149(2) (as amended 1987).
338. See Bermann, supra note 333, at 432-42.
339. See supra note 335 and accompanying text. From the beginning, certain issues
in agriculture, transport, competition law, and commercial policy were voted on by
qualified majority. See Bermann, supra note 333, at 52. The SEA widely increased the
use of qualified majority voting to the harmonization of national laws for the internal
market. Id. The Treaty on European Union further extended qualified majority vot-
ing to most measures in environmental and consumer protection, public health, and
education. Id
340. Note that in the Community each nation has a seat on the Council of Minis-
ters, the collective head of state. Id. at 15.
341. See EEC Treaty art. 148 (outlining qualified majority voting). Qualified ma-jority is a weighted system of voting which assigns each nation a certain number of
votes based on its population. This method is analogous to the U.S. electoral college
system of voting.
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members' concern over having only a few small nations dictate mili-
tary actions for which the permanent members would bear the
burden. 4 2
CONCLUSION
Most observers of the U.N. have found consensus on one thing:
"the U.N. has not found an effective role for itself since the fall of the
Berlin Wall and needs radical reform."13 3 The U.N. Charter, though
noble in its attempt to provide armed forces under a "sovereign" U.N.
command through the conclusion of Article 43 special agreements,
has so far failed as miserably as the League of Nations failed in this
area. In the United States, the problem that existed in the Wilsonian
era-the desire only to protect recognized spheres of influence-still
exists today? 4 While the U.S.'s global commitment may change with
a radical, new president willing to take matters into his own hands, or
an enlightened Congress not overly obsessed with polls, the near fu-
ture does not look promising for a revitalization of the Article 43
agreements or the use of the U.N.P.A. If Congress does pass the pro-
posed measures concerning the U.N.P.A., such measures would limit
the role of the United States, the only real remaining superpower,
even further in the U.N. This domestic tension within the United
States affects international prospects for peace-keeping actions by cre-
ating a scenario where the United States would be forced to veto ac-
tions not authorized by Congress, thus perpetuating the history of the
failure to conclude Article 43 agreements.
The Security Council has never made Article 43 special agreements
because the permanent members, especially the United States, have
never wanted to relinquish sovereignty or control of their troops. Big
Five unanimity is not an impossibility, but as history has shown, it is
an improbability when widely varying national interests can be pro-
tected by a veto. The only way to assure that the Security Council will
conclude Article 43 agreements is to eliminate the veto power over
such agreements and implement a system of qualified majority voting
comparable to that of the European Community.
342. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing the permanent mem-
bers' concern about shouldering the burden of the military forces).
343. Younge, supra note 275, at T3. "Both Bush and Clinton spoke of the new
world order as if it were just around the comer. In fact, it is still in a period of gesta-
tion, and its final form will not be visible until well into the next century." Schlesinger,
supra note 149, at 8 (statement of Henry Kissinger). Wilson's dream of collective
security is as far from realization now as it was three quarters of a century ago. ld.
344. See Schlesinger, supra note 149, at 6 ("[There has been an] argument that has
been going on all this century in the United States--an argument between those, like
Theodore Roosevelt, who would base foreign policy on national interest and the pres-
ervation of a balance of power, and those like Woodrow Wilson, who dream of a new
world order based on collective security.").

